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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines how the composition of an investment adviser’s client base (identified via 
Form ADV filings) relates to the performance of its mutual funds. Investment advisers catering to 
institutional clients realize statistically and economically superior risk-adjusted mutual fund 
performance relative to retail-oriented advisers. The findings are consistent with the empirical 
predictions of the Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018) model for asset management markets. The results 
suggest that institutional clients can identify differences in investment manager skill, particularly 
in market segments where retail mutual fund investors face higher search costs.  
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1. Introduction 
There exists substantial variation in the clientele of investment advisory firms that manage 
mutual funds. Some firms cater to retail investors, either through their mutual fund business or 
separate accounts for individual investors (retail-oriented advisers). In recent decades, however, 
many firms, such as AQR Capital Management, who cater primarily to a sophisticated, 
institutional client base (institutional-oriented advisers), have either launched or expanded their 
footprint in the mutual fund industry. LSV Asset Management (LSV), for instance, opened its first 
mutual fund in 1999 (the LSV Value Equity Fund) five years after its founding in 1994.1 The 
opening of this fund brought the firm’s expertise in value investing, previously available only to 
institutional clients, to retail investors. This trend of institutional-oriented advisers opening mutual 
funds has continued as mutual fund assets have benefitted from growth in the popularity of defined 
contribution plans (e.g., Sialm, Starks, and Zhang, 2015). Since 1999, for example, LSV has added 
five more mutual funds to their line-up.  
The relationship between mutual fund performance and the presence of institutional clients 
for an investment adviser, however, is not clear – recent studies suggest that it could be positive, 
neutral, or negative. First, recent theoretical work suggests mutual fund performance will be 
positively related to institutional clientele. Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018) argue that large and 
sophisticated investors can better identify manager skill because search costs are low relative to 
capital. Their model, similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) for individual assets, addresses a 
                                                          
 
1 According to their website, LSV managed $119 billion in value equity portfolios for 350 clients as of March 31, 
2018. This implies an average client size of approximately $340 million. Since LSV only managed six mutual funds 
as of this date, this suggests that LSV’s separate account clients have very high levels of capital relative to the typical 
retail investor. For example, LSV’s client base consists of many large public pension plans such as the Louisiana State 
Employees’ Retirement System (LASERS). As of March 31, 2018, LSV managed over $1 billion in assets in three 
different style mandates for LASERS. See https://lasersonline.org/investments/asset-allocation-charts/breakdown-of-
asset-classes-with-managers/. 
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paradox in asset management markets. Specifically, public signals about asset managers such as 
their assets under management (AUM) cannot fully reveal which managers are more skilled or 
informed since, if they did, no investor would have an incentive to search and perform due 
diligence. The model therefore, predicts that mutual funds managed by institutional-oriented 
advisers will tend to outperform.2 Recent empirical work, however, suggests an inverse relation 
between an adviser’s mutual fund performance and the presence of more sophisticated, 
institutional clients. Specifically, Ben-Rephael and Israelsen (2018) and Del Guercio, Genc, and 
Tran (2018) find that advisers may favor more sophisticated, institutional clients at the expense of 
their mutual funds through favorable trade allocations and/or cross-subsidization. Ultimately, the 
link between an adviser’s non-mutual fund clientele and their mutual fund performance is an 
empirical question.  
In this paper, I investigate the relation between an investment adviser’s clientele and the 
performance of the mutual funds they manage using Form ADV filings.3 Investment advisers to 
mutual funds are required to annually file Form ADV with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and disclose the types of clients for which they manage assets. The mandatory 
filings provide a natural panel of client composition data that is free of selection biases. Importantly, 
Form ADV provides a granular breakdown of clientele and direct separate account clients are 
                                                          
 
2 Berk and Green (2004), in contrast, model a fully efficient asset management market where, due to rational fund 
flows eroding skilled managers’ alpha, advisers’ institutional clientele levels will be independent of future 
performance. 
3 Form ADV is a public filing but has historically been limited in its availability to the public. The full set of filings 
(since the inception of electronic filing in 2001) was only recently made available via Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request to the SEC in 2015. Prior to that, Form ADV data had to be hand collected from the SEC’s website 
and only the most recent filing for each adviser was available. Additionally, it is also likely that clients of asset 
managers have not recognized there is value in the information disclosed on Form ADV. As detailed above, prior 
academic literature has suggested the possibility of both a positive and negative relationship between the presence of 
institutional clients and mutual fund performance.  
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identified by type (e.g., high net worth individuals versus charitable organizations) allowing for 
reasonably accurate identification of each investment adviser’s client base.4 One confounding 
issue is the fact that some investment advisers delegate the portfolio management of their mutual 
funds to a sub-adviser. Chen et al. (2013) find that nearly one-third of mutual funds are sub-advised, 
i.e., a different investment adviser (the sub-adviser) provides portfolio management services to the 
fund and is ultimately responsible for generating the fund’s performance track record. For example, 
The Hartford MidCap Fund (as well as many other Hartford Funds) is sub-advised by Wellington 
Management Company, LLP. To address this issue, the clientele of the fund’s sub-adviser is used 
when assessing the performance of sub-advised funds (sub-adviser sample). Since this study 
concentrates on performance as an outcome variable, I primarily focus on this sample throughout 
the paper.  
The empirical results reveal that mutual funds managed by institutional-oriented advisers 
outperform funds managed by retail-oriented advisers. In a sort of funds by lagged adviser clientele, 
funds managed by investment advisers with a percentage of institutional clients in the top half of 
the sample (approximately greater than 25% institutional clients) outperform funds whose adviser 
has no institutional clients by approximately 80 basis points annually as measured by 4-factor 
alpha. The economic magnitude of this difference in risk-adjusted performance is similar to other 
recent studies that examine how the operational characteristics of mutual fund management 
companies relate to fund performance. For example, Chen et al. (2013) find that outsourced mutual 
                                                          
 
4 I focus on non-mutual fund clients to identify institutional clients (i.e., separate accounts and private funds). This 
approach is consistent with P&I and ICI data which indicate mutual fund shareholders are primarily retail investors. 
Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2017) cite P&I surveys 2012 data which shows that out of $48 trillion in delegated 
institutional assets only $5 trillion was managed in mutual funds. The ICI’s 2016 factbook offers a similar picture of 
institutional investment in mutual funds. According to their figures, $15.6 trillion was invested in mutual funds as of 
December 31, 2015. Of this, $13.5 trillion or 87% consisted of individual investors and $2.1 trillion consisted of 
institutional investors. 
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funds underperform those managed in-house by 50 basis points annually, and Del Guercio and 
Reuter (2014) find that broker-sold retail funds underperform direct-sold retail funds by 
approximately 110 basis points per year. Once fund and adviser controls are introduced, panel 
OLS regression estimates confirm that these results are not driven by other fund and/or adviser 
observables, style, or time effects. Furthermore, I document that multiple types of institutional 
clients contribute to the relationship (i.e., charities, government clients, and pension plans), and 
that significant differences in mutual fund performance realized by institutional and retail-oriented 
advisers persist for up to four years. 
The second half of this study aims to understand why this relationship exists and persists. 
In a rational asset management market, mutual fund investors’ flows would erode any predictable 
differences in performance. In particular, I examine whether a portion of this relationship can be 
attributed the Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018) mechanism that institutional clients exert greater 
search effort to identify differences in manager skill. While a growing body of literature points to 
clientele issues in investment management, the extant literature has focused largely on how the 
presence of more sophisticated clients affects governance and incentives for the asset manager.5 
This study is the first to test if search costs incurred by institutional clients play a role in the 
observed relationship between client sophistication and investment manager returns. 
My approach to testing the search costs hypothesis is two-fold. The first set of tests 
considers the search costs mechanism from the perspective of the mutual fund investors. I start by 
investigating if the relationship between institutional clients and mutual fund returns is more 
pronounced in segments of the mutual fund industry where mutual fund investors have been 
                                                          
 
5 See, for example, Del Guercio and Reuter (2014), Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012), and Del Guercio, Genc, and 
Tran (2018). 
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empirically shown to face higher search costs. When search costs are higher, mutual fund investors 
may be unable or unwilling to identify variation in manager skill and erode differences in 
performance via fund flows, allowing the observed effect to persist. I follow Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) in identifying three proxies for search costs in the mutual fund industry. Since mutual fund 
distribution and marketing decisions tend be made at the organizational level (e.g., Del Guercio 
and Reuter 2014), I focus on variables aggregated to the fund family level to proxy for search costs. 
The measures of search costs include: fund family size as measured by total net assets, the 
aggregate dollar value of marketing and distribution expenditures borne by the fund family’s 
shareholders (i.e., 12b-1 fees and loads), and a measure of media attention. The media attention 
measure is taken from a recent study by Kaniel and Parham (2017) and is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the family has had a fund featured on the Wall Street Journal’s (WSJ) “Category 
Kings” lists in the recent past. Consistent with costly search contributing to the observed effect, I 
find evidence across all three proxies that the positive relationship between the presence 
institutional clientele and fund returns is stronger in the mutual fund market segments where 
mutual fund investors face higher search costs, i.e., smaller fund families, families with lower 
levels of marketing and distribution expenditures, and families garnering less media attention. 
These are segments of the mutual fund industry where institutional clients arguably hold an 
advantage in identifying variation in manager skill over retail mutual fund investors.  
The second set of tests evaluates whether there is evidence that institutional clients exert 
greater effort in the manager search process. My tests broadly examine if institutional clients’ use 
of operational characteristics and performance measures in the manager selection process is more 
discerning than mutual fund investors’.  
13 
 
 
 
First, I test if there is a relationship between an adviser’s institutional client presence and 
the operational characteristics sought in manager searches undertaken by consultants to 
institutional plan sponsors. Though search costs incurred by institutional plan sponsors to find 
investment managers can take on many forms, a common approach involves hiring investment 
consulting firms to assist in the manager search and due diligence process.6 A typical first step in 
this process requires investment advisers to submit information about their advisory business and 
investment products to consultants and plan sponsors via requests for proposal (RFPs) or due 
diligence questionnaires (DDQs) for evaluation and initial screening. Reviewing a sample of 
RFPs/DDQs reveals that a significant portion of due diligence efforts are focused on the 
investment adviser’s conflicts of interest, incentives, and operational risk.7 The adviser’s Form 
ADV disclosures and other sources are used to test if these operational characteristics of interest 
to consultants and other investment professionals are associated with a greater presence of 
institutional clients for mutual fund advisers. The results show that the operational characteristics 
associated with higher levels of institutional clients for mutual fund advisers are remarkably 
similar to those sought by institutional consultants and plan sponsors in investment manager 
searches. Institutional-oriented advisers are larger (higher AUM), less likely to have financial 
industry affiliates (i.e., independent), less likely to be related to a brokerage firm, less likely to 
have prior legal/regulatory issues disclosed on their Form ADV, more likely to have direct 
employee ownership, more likely to have a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) focused solely on 
                                                          
 
6 See literature that examines manager search by institutional plan sponsors such as Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), 
Goyal and Wahal (2008), and Jenkinson, Jones, and Martinez (2016).  
7  While some plan sponsors and consultants post RFPs/DDQs publicly, I also review DDQs embedded within 
consultant databases (e.g., eVestment Alliance, PSN/Informa, Wilshire, Callan, Cambridge, etc.).  
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regulatory compliance, more likely to claim compliance with the Global Investment Performance 
Standards (GIPS), and less likely to engage in agency cross-trading of client accounts.8 
Second, I evaluate the performance measures institutional clients use when making 
manager hiring and firing decisions. While the institutional manager search process clearly goes 
beyond the examination of a manager’s past performance, prior studies (Del Guercio and Tkac, 
2002; Goyal and Wahal, 2008; Jenkinson, Jones, and Martinez, 2016) find that performance still 
plays a significant role in the manager selection and termination process. To the extent that 
performance is considered in manager evaluation, it would be expected that investment 
professionals hired by institutional plan sponsors use more sophisticated risk-adjusted measures 
of past performance than the typical retail mutual fund investor (e.g., 3-factor or 4-factor alphas as 
opposed to CAPM alpha). In these tests, I use the adviser’s mutual fund performance to serve as a 
proxy for institutional client performance. There is a high likelihood that institutional separate 
accounts and mutual funds managed by the same adviser would realize relatively correlated 
performance as they typically share common trading desks, research analysts, and portfolio 
managers.9 Consistent with this notion, I find that past mutual fund performance is positively 
associated with changes in institutional clients for the investment adviser. Consistent with the idea 
that institutional clients exert effort in the manager selection/termination process, results from 
horserace tests suggest that changes in institutional clients are best predicted by past 3-factor or 4-
                                                          
 
8 Advisers are required by Rule 206(4)-7 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to appoint a Chief Compliance 
Officer (CCO) who is responsible for ensuring the firm has policies and procedures in place to prevent violations of 
securities laws. Some advisers’ CCOs have operational responsibilities (e.g., Portfolio Manager, Chief Operating 
Officer, etc.) in addition to their duties as CCO. The GIPS standards are a set of standards governing the presentation 
of separate account composite performance set forth by the CFA Institute. The standards help to make separate account 
performance comparable across products and firms by ensuring that advisers do not cherry pick accounts or time 
periods and provide sufficient disclosures pertinent to performance evaluation. 
9 For example, Cliff Asness and Andrea Frazzini are listed portfolio managers on multiple mutual funds for AQR as 
well as private funds and separate account offerings. 
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factor alphas as opposed to CAPM alpha. In contrast, mutual fund flows tend to be more responsive 
to CAPM alpha which is consistent with recent studies by Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) and 
Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016). 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that directly compares the performance 
of institutional investment management firms to retail-oriented investment management firms. The 
use of mutual fund performance provides an ‘apples-to-apples’ comparison, as open-end mutual 
funds have the same regulatory, liquidity, and disclosure requirements. This study closely relates 
to literature that examines clientele issues for investment management firms. For instance, studies 
(i.e., Busse, Goyal, and Wahal, 2010 and Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse, 2017) examine 
whether investment strategies marketed to institutional plan sponsors and their investment 
consultants via commercial databases garner positive abnormal returns.10 Del Guercio and Reuter 
(2014) consider how different mutual fund distribution channels and clienteles (i.e., direct-sold 
versus broker-sold) impact mutual fund families’ incentives and performance. I build on their work 
by examining how an organization’s non-mutual fund client base relates to mutual fund 
performance.  
This study is also related to prior work examining the side-by-side management of mutual 
funds and other types of clients.11 Within this literature, the closest related paper is Evans and 
Fahlenbrach (2012) who examine how the presence of institutional clients invested in institutional 
mutual funds and separate accounts managed side-by-side (in the same strategy or product) with 
                                                          
 
10 Prior work that investigates the performance of institutional asset management firms identifies institutional asset 
management firms as the set of firms that report performance to commercial databases maintained or subscribed to by 
investment consultants that advise large institutional investors. I use regulatory filings as opposed to commercial 
databases to identify institutional asset management firms. These studies also examine the performance of separate 
account composites as opposed to mutual funds. 
11 For example, there is literature which examines the side-by-side management of hedge funds and mutual funds (e.g., 
Del Guercio, Genc, and Tran, 2018; Nohel, Wang, and Zheng, 2010; Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi 2010). 
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retail mutual funds impacts governance and incentives for the retail mutual funds. My work builds 
upon theirs in two important ways. First, I document an organizational level effect in the 
relationship between institutional clients and fund performance. This is consistent with marketing 
and distribution strategy being determined at the organization level as well as recent theoretical 
and empirical work by Brown and Wu (2015) who find that clients of asset managers weigh 
organizational skill in addition to fund skill in their investment decisions. Second, I document that 
a different mechanism contributes to the relationship. This is the first study to present evidence 
that clients’ search and selection efforts also appear to play a role (in addition to governance and 
incentives for the manager) in accounting for the positive relationship between client 
sophistication and fund performance.12  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the data, Section 3 
establishes the positive relationship between institutional clientele and mutual fund performance, 
Section 4 tests the search costs hypothesis, Section5 discusses additional tests and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and variables 
2.1. Form ADV data  
Section 203A of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires that all investment advisers 
to mutual funds register with the SEC and submit an annual amendment to their Form ADV within 
                                                          
 
12 Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012) acknowledge that more sophisticated institutional manager search processes may 
play a role in their findings, but their work exclusively focuses on a governance and incentives explanation for the 
results. 
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90 days of their fiscal year end. This provides a natural panel dataset free of selection biases.13 
Form ADV data was gathered via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from the SEC and 
includes the complete sample of ADV filings between 2001 (the beginning of electronic filing) 
and March 2016.14  
ADV Item 5D presents a breakdown of client types for each investment adviser. 
Designated client types include: “individuals”, “high net worth individuals”, “banking or thrift 
institutions”, “investment companies”, “business development companies”, “pooled investment 
vehicles (other than investment companies)”, “pension and profit sharing plans (but not the plan 
participants)”, “charitable organizations”, “corporations or other businesses not listed above”, 
“state or municipal government entities”, “other investment advisers”, “insurance companies”, and 
“other” entities. Advisers are required to select one of the following percentage band categories 
for each investor type: none, up to 10%, 11-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, 76-99%, and 100%. 
Importantly, values refer to percent of clients rather than percent of assets. Although these values 
are likely to be positively correlated, it is possible that for a given manager, institutional investors 
comprise a large fraction of their clients but a much smaller fraction of their assets. On the other 
hand, a large number of institutional clients may be a stronger indication of manager vetting than 
a few institutional clients that account for the bulk of assets. Appendix A provides a sample Item 
5D from a Form ADV filing. 
                                                          
 
13  Prior studies that examine institutional asset managers or the presence of institutional clients generally use 
commercial databases. The primary function of commercial databases is to market investment strategies, and managers 
have incentives to only advertise their best performing strategies. This may result in self-selection bias. 
14 There has been limited research in the finance literature conducted using Form ADV filings because previous 
researchers primarily used samples of hand gathered data. Two such studies examining mutual fund advisers include 
Chen et al. (2013) who examine the performance of outsourced mutual funds, and Casavecchia and Tiwari (2016) 
who examine how investment adviser cross-trading practices affect mutual fund performance. Dimmock and Gerken 
(2012) were the first to use a complete panel set of Form ADV filings and provide a thorough overview of the nature 
of information disclosed by each registered investment adviser. 
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A confounding issue in examining investment advisers to mutual funds is that some 
advisers delegate the portfolio management function of their mutual funds to other investment 
advisers, a practice known as sub-advising (e.g., Chen et al., 2013; Del Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac, 
2007). If a fund is sub-advised, the investment adviser is likely involved in fund distribution and 
the selection/monitoring of sub-advisers while a sub-adviser(s) is responsible for managing the 
portfolio. To account for the possible separation of these functions, I focus on two samples of 
funds. The ‘adviser sample’ uses clientele and ADV data for each fund’s investment adviser and 
includes the full sample of funds. I use the adviser sample when examining distribution and 
marketing outcome variables for funds, such as flows. The ‘sub-adviser sample’ focuses on the 
adviser that provides portfolio management services to the fund. For funds that are not sub-advised 
the investment adviser clientele and Form ADV data are used. If a fund is sub-advised, the sub-
adviser’s clientele and Form ADV data are used. I focus on the sub-adviser sample when 
examining portfolio management outcome variables such as performance. I drop fund-month 
observations (about 12% of the sample) which have more than one sub-adviser from the sub-
adviser sample, because the relative roles (percent managed) of each sub-adviser is unknown.15 
Consistent with the sample from Chen et al. (2013), I find that 34% of fund-month observations 
are sub-advised and 22% of fund-month observations are outsourced to unaffiliated sub-advisers. 
Because Form ADV reports the presence of client types within bands, I use band midpoints 
to approximate the composition of each adviser’s client base. If individual investors are listed as 
51-75% of clients, for instance, I assign a value of 63%. Table 1 presents investment adviser 
                                                          
 
15 Data on sub-advisers are collected from N-SAR filings. I thank Leonard Kostevetsky for sharing this data, see 
Kostevetsky and Maconi (2018). 
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clientele summary statistics. Investment companies (mutual funds) are the largest client group 
accounting for 39.8% of the average adviser’s clients in the adviser sample and 30.2% of clients 
in the sub-adviser sample.16 Individual investors and high net worth individuals are the next two 
most important groups accounting for a combined 30.0% of clients in the adviser sample and 35.1% 
of clients in the sub-adviser sample. This is consistent with mutual funds being retail-oriented 
vehicles and mutual fund advisers also catering to the retail market segment in their separate 
account products. Because separate account clients are partitioned into specific clientele (e.g., 
individual investors versus charitable organizations), ADV disclosures provide a relatively precise 
picture of each adviser’s non-mutual fund business.  
One complication, however, is that Form ADV instructions allow for double counting 
within client categories. For example, if CalPERS is a separate account client of the investment 
adviser, they would count as both a municipal or state government entity as well as a pension plan. 
To address this issue, only mutually exclusive categories of clients are used. I begin by including 
municipal or state government entities (Public), corporations and other businesses (Corporate), 
and charitable organizations (Charity). Together these categories cover a substantial portion of 
entities in the public sector, private for-profit sector, and private non-profit sector respectively.17   
Pooled investment vehicles (other than investment companies) (Private Funds) are also 
included in the measure of institutional clientele. Private funds managed by mutual fund advisers 
                                                          
 
16 Importantly, the investment companies and pooled investment vehicles client categories on Form ADV measure 
each fund as one client.  
17 In October of 2017, the SEC changed the nature of client type information disclosed on Form ADV. Advisers now 
disclose exact client percentages as opposed to percentage bands. The Form also asks registrants to categorize each 
client into the type they consider most appropriate. Thus, double counting will no longer be an issue for Form ADV 
client disclosures going forward.   
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are primarily long-only commingled funds but also include hedge funds. 18  To assess the 
sophistication of private funds as clients, I consider underlying shareholders who make buy and 
sell decisions in these funds. Since private funds may not make a public offering of their shares, 
they are generally limited to “accredited investors” or “qualified purchasers” to comply with 
Sections 3(c)(7) or 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. This requires investors in 
private funds to have significant net worth, income or investable assets, i.e. institutional investors 
or high net worth individuals. Thus, private funds are included in the measure of institutional 
clientele for each mutual fund’s investment adviser, calculated as  
 
, , , , ,% . % % % %j t j t j t j t j tInst Clients Public Corporate Charity Private Funds= + + +  .   (1) 
 
Where %Publicj,t is the percentage of state or municipal government entities that make up 
investment adviser j’s client base in year t, %Corporatej,t is the percentage of corporations or other 
businesses that make up investment adviser j’s client base in year t, %Charityj,t is the percentage 
of charitable organizations that make up investment adviser j’s client base in year t; and %Private 
Fundsj,t is the percentage of pooled investment vehicles (other than investment companies) that 
make up investment adviser j’s client base in year t. Table 5 reruns baseline tests with a breakout 
of single client types from Form ADV. These results show that the baseline tests are not driven by 
a single client type and are not particularly sensitive to the decisions made to include certain types 
of clients in the measure. My classification algorithm appears to adequately partition advisers into 
retail-oriented versus institutional-oriented. For example, Appendix C provides a sample list of 
                                                          
 
18 See Del Guercio, Genc, and Tran (2018). The summary statistics for their sample indicate that more than 50% of 
mutual fund managers also manage private funds, while less than 10% of portfolio managers simultaneously manage 
hedge funds. 
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firms in the top decile of %Inst. Clients for 2015 and shows that well-known institutional-oriented 
advisers (e.g., LSV, DE Shaw and GMO) are identified as such. 
Table 1 shows that the average fund’s adviser has 19.0% institutional clients in the adviser 
sample while the average percentage of institutional clientele in the sub-adviser sample is 23.9%. 
These numbers support findings in Del Guercio, Reuter, and Tkac (2007) who indicate mutual 
fund portfolio management is often outsourced to institutional separate account managers. Fig. 1 
shows that the average percentage of institutional clients managed by mutual fund investment 
advisers has steadily increased during the sample period. This is consistent with the notion that 
institutional-oriented managers have been chasing the substantial flows to mutual funds attributed 
to the growth in popularity of defined contribution plans.19 Fig. 2 presents histograms of the 
distribution of institutional clientele for the adviser sample and sub-adviser samples in the first and 
last years of the sample. The histograms show that many funds are managed by advisers with zero 
or near zero institutional clients, but that substantial variation exists. The adviser sample contains 
much more mass at or near zero institutional clients, particularly early in the sample period. 
Form ADV data is also used to control for adviser characteristics and/or conflicts of interest 
which may influence fund performance. Control variables include the natural log of the adviser’s 
total assets under management (Log(AUM)) and the natural log of the adviser’s number of client 
accounts managed (Log(Accts)). I also account for the adviser’s financial industry affiliations.20 
These include: an indicator variable measuring whether the adviser operates as or is affiliated with 
a commercial bank or trust company (Related Bank), an indicator variable capturing whether the 
                                                          
 
19 See the ICI 2016 factbook. Defined contribution plan mutual fund assets have tripled since 2000, reaching $3.6 
trillion in 2015. This amounts to nearly a quarter of all assets invested in mutual funds. 
20 For example, Berzins, Liu, and Trzcinka (2013) show that asset management firms owned by investment banks 
tend to underperform. Similarly, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2018) show that asset management firms operated within 
commercial banking groups tend to underperform. 
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adviser operates as or is affiliated with a broker-dealer (Related Brokerage) and an indicator 
variable which denotes if the adviser operates as or is affiliated with an insurance company 
(Related Insurance). Lastly, I consider other factors which may influence the extent to which the 
adviser’s interests are aligned with their clients’. These include: an indicator variable which 
captures whether adviser charges performance-based fees (Performance Fees) and the extent to 
which the adviser engages in the cross trading of client accounts (Agency Cross Trade). Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics for these variables and Appendix A includes details on the sources 
and construction of each variable. 
 
2.2. Mutual fund data and variables 
Form ADV data are matched with the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database 
on the investment adviser names provided by CRSP.21 The sample covers 2003 to 2015.22 CRSP 
provides information on fund returns, total net assets (TNA), investment objectives, and other fund 
characteristics. Fund characteristics and returns are aggregated across share classes on an asset-
weighted basis using the CRSP class group variable (crsp_cl_grp). The oldest available share class 
is used to compute fund age. CRSP returns are net after fees, expenses and brokerage commissions 
but before any front-end or back-end loads. Net fund returns are converted to excess returns by 
subtracting the corresponding risk-free rate.23 Monthly time series data on the market, size, value, 
momentum, investment, and profitability factors are from Kenneth French’s website.  
                                                          
 
21 More than 97% of fund-month observations in CRSP are matched to the Form ADV data. Sub-adviser names and 
SEC (801-) numbers are from data provided by Leonard Kostevetsky.  
22 The sample begins in 2003 because lagged clientele data are used and many advisers did not begin filing Form 
ADV electronically until 2002. 
23 Data on the monthly risk-free rate are obtained from Kenneth French’s website.  
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The analyses focus on diversified actively managed domestic equity funds. Index funds 
(identified via the CRSP index fund flag and fund names), ETFs, and variable annuities are 
excluded from the sample. The sample is further restricted (using the CRSP style code) to domestic 
equity funds with specified objectives of mid-cap, small-cap, micro-cap, growth, growth and 
income, and equity income. I require funds to have a minimum TNA value of $5 million as of the 
previous month end and at least 75% of their portfolio invested in common stocks. The adviser 
sample includes 267,132 fund-month observations from 3,463 unique mutual funds managed by 
855 investment advisers. The sub-adviser sample includes 234,115 fund-month observations from 
3,204 unique mutual funds managed by 1,099 investment advisers. 
Tests focus on monthly 4-factor alphas for each fund computed as the difference between 
the fund’s realized monthly excess return in month t and the fund’s model benchmark return 
estimated for month t. The benchmark return is estimated by multiplying month t factor 
realizations with factor loadings estimated over the previous 24 months. The 4-factor model uses 
the market (MKT_RF), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors. For robustness, 
CAPM alpha and a 6-factor alpha are considered as additional performance measures. Analogously, 
one-month forward looking CAPM alpha is calculated using only the market factor. The 6-factor 
alpha adds the investment (CMA) and profitability (RMW) factors (Fama and French, 2015; 
Jordan and Riley, 2015) to the 4-factor model (Carhart 1997).  
Tests include fund-level control variables that may influence performance including: the 
natural log of fund total net assets (Log(TNA)), fund turnover (Turnover), fund expense ratio 
(Expense), natural log of fund age (Log(Age)), the sum of fund flows over the previous 12 months 
(Net Flows) and the standard deviation of fund flows over the previous 12 months (Std Flows). 
The presence of more sophisticated investors in mutual funds is accounted for using the percentage 
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of fund assets derived from institutional share classes (I Share). It is also possible that institutional-
oriented advisers circumvent the Berk and Green (2004) mechanism by closing their funds to new 
investors before they get too large, allowing advisers to generate abnormal returns.24 To address 
this issue, I also include an indicator variable that denotes whether the fund is closed to new 
investors (Closed). Lastly, I construct an indicator variable which captures whether the fund is 
outsourced to a sub-adviser that is unaffiliated with the primary investment adviser (Outsourced) 
(i.e., Chen et al., 2013). All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 to account for the 
possibility of outliers. Mutual fund summary statistics are reported in Table 2. Data sources and 
details on the construction of each variable are contained in Appendix A.  
 
3. Do mutual funds managed by institutional-oriented advisers earn higher returns? 
 
3.1. Sorts of funds by lagged investment adviser clientele 
The analysis begins by partitioning fund-month observations in both the adviser and sub-
adviser samples into five groups based on lagged investment adviser institutional clientele and 
examining the means of mutual fund characteristics by group in Table 3. The five groups consist 
of funds managed by investment advisers with the following ranges of institutional clients: none, 
greater than 0% but less than or equal to 10%, greater than 10% but less than or equal to 25%, 
greater than 25% but less than or equal to 50%, and greater than 50%. Fixed clientele percentages 
are used to partition the sample as opposed to partitioning groups into an equal number of 
                                                          
 
24 For example, Gupta and Sachdeva (2018) find evidence that hedge fund managers keep funds with high levels of 
employee investment artificially small to attain higher abnormal returns. Consistent with this possibility, I find that 
many investment consultant RFPs and DDQs ask the adviser what the AUM capacity is for their investment strategies. 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
observations (e.g., quintiles) to illustrate how mean fund characteristics and the distribution of 
observations change when considering the adviser sample as opposed to the sub-adviser sample.25  
Table 3 reveals the primary result of this study – a strong positive relationship between 
institutional clientele and fund performance, as measured by 4-factor alpha, for both the adviser 
and sub-adviser samples. Economically, differences in mean monthly 4-factor alphas for the sub-
adviser sample show that mutual funds managed by advisers with institutional client percentages 
in the top half of the sample (>25%), outperform funds managed by advisers with zero institutional 
clients by approximately 80 basis points annually. Statistically, differences in mean 4-factor alphas 
between the highest and lowest institutional clientele groups are significant at the 5% level or 
better in both samples (t-stats of 2.08 for the adviser sample and 4.15 for the sub-adviser sample).26  
Table 3 also suggests that the relationship between the percentage of institutional clients 
and mutual performance may not be linear. While there are substantial increases in performance 
from lowest (equal to zero) to the second highest institutional client group (between 25% and 50%), 
performance slightly declines thereafter in highest clientele group (> 50%) by less than half of one 
basis point per month in the sub-adviser sample.27 This suggests that once sufficient manager 
vetting has occurred, there may no longer be significant differences in performance associated with 
further changes in institutional clients. The nature of the relationship presents the possibility that 
perhaps institutional plan sponsors and consultants act as screening mechanism in avoiding 
                                                          
 
25 The highest institutional clientele group (>50%) makes up approximately the top quartile of the sub-adviser sample 
but only approximately the top decile of the adviser sample. The top two institutional clientele groups (>25%) make 
up approximately the top half of the sub-adviser sample but only the top quartile of the adviser sample. 
26 Standard errors are taken from univariate regressions and are clustered on investment adviser. 
27 Table 3 indicates that funds in the highest institutional client group tend to be larger and are more likely to be 
outsourced which may contribute to their lower performance relative to the second highest institutional clientele group. 
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particularly poor managers that operate in the retail mutual fund space.28 Results tabulated using 
a piecewise linear regression in Table 10 of Section 5 allowing for kinks in the relationship at 25% 
and 50% confirm the effect from institutional clients on performance is most pronounced between 
0% and 25% institutional clients for the investment adviser.  
Table 3 also reveals relationships between other fund characteristics and the adviser’s 
institutional clientele. Expense ratios decrease as institutional clientele increases which is 
consistent with the findings of Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012). However, the differences in expense 
ratios between the highest and lowest institutional clientele groups in both samples clearly do not 
fully account for the differences in net performance (at approximately 16 basis points annually). I 
also find that institutional-oriented advisers obtain a greater fraction of mutual fund assets from 
institutional share classes and are more likely to close their funds to new investors relative to retail-
oriented advisers.  
Lastly, there are substantial differences in fund outsourcing between the lowest and highest 
institutional clientele groups in both samples. The adviser sample shows that the bulk of 
outsourced funds are marketed or distributed by retail-oriented advisers while the sub-adviser 
sample indicates that a substantial portion of outsourced funds are managed by institutional-
oriented advisers. The notion that retail-oriented advisers seek out institutional advisers’ 
investment management expertise when outsourcing portfolio management duties for their funds 
speaks to the skill differences between the two types of firms. Moreover, the outsourcing 
relationship demonstrates that using only investment adviser clientele (as opposed to sub-adviser 
clientele) to examine the relationship between clientele and mutual fund performance misclassifies 
                                                          
 
28 This would be consistent with the findings of Goyal and Wahal (2008) and Jenkinson, Jones, and Martinez (2016) 
who show that institutional plan sponsors and consultants lack skill in selecting institutional managers. In their samples, 
retail-oriented managers are likely screened out in the due diligence and RFP (request-for-proposal) processes. 
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many funds. Particularly, those whose investment adviser has lower levels of institutional clientele, 
because there exists a substantial fraction of retail-oriented advisers that sub-advise to institutional-
oriented advisers. These differences, along with the fact that the presence of institutional clients 
among mutual fund advisers has been steadily increasing over the sample period (see Fig. 1), 
demonstrate the need to examine the relationship between institutional clientele and mutual fund 
performance using a panel regression setting, controlling for observables.  
 
3.2.  Panel regression results 
Differences in risk-adjusted performance are next examined within a regression framework 
that controls for observables. Table 4 presents panel OLS regressions which regress monthly fund 
alphas on lagged measures of adviser institutional clientele and controls. Each regression includes 
investment objective-by-month fixed effects so that each performance measure is relative to other 
actively managed funds with the same investment style, operating in the same month. The 
regression specification closely follows Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) who test for a similar effect 
on performance stemming from an organization’s mutual fund clientele. The main variable of 
interest is the percentage of institutional clients for each fund’s investment adviser/sub-adviser 
(%Inst. Clients). Coefficient estimates on this variable are multiplied by 12, so the economic 
interpretation of the coefficients is the quantity of annual alpha (in percent) associated with a one 
percentage point change in the institutional clientele of the fund’s investment adviser. I focus on 
the sub-adviser sample since 4-factor alpha is a portfolio management outcome variable. Standard 
errors in all columns are clustered on investment adviser.  
Table 4 clearly demonstrates that mutual funds managed by institutional-oriented advisers 
realize higher risk-adjusted returns. The first three columns examine 4-factor alpha as the 
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dependent variable. The coefficient estimates on %Inst. Clients in all three columns are significant 
at the 1% level with t-statistics greater than three. In column (1) where 4-factor alpha is regressed 
on %Inst. Clients without control variables, the coefficient estimate indicates that a one percentage 
point increase in the percentage of institutional clients of the investment adviser is associated with 
1.2 basis points higher annual 4-factor alpha.29 The results in the remaining columns reveal that 
the other factors I consider do not drive the relation between an adviser’s mutual fund performance 
and the extent to which an adviser’s other fund and business characteristics arise from institutional 
clients, as the relation between institutional clientele and mutual fund performance changes little 
when introducing control variables into the model. Specifically, once controls are introduced in 
columns (2) and (3), the results show that a one percentage point increase in institutional clientele 
is associated with higher annual 4-factor alphas of approximately one basis point. The estimates 
are economically significant. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 focus on CAPM and 6-factor alpha 
as dependent variables. Coefficient estimates on %Inst. Clients in columns (5) and (6) are 
statistically significant (at the 1% and 5% levels respectively) with similar economic magnitudes.   
Overall, the panel regression results confirm that mutual funds managed by institutional-
oriented advisers earn higher risk-adjusted returns. The results are consistent with Gârleanu and 
Pedersen (2018) who predict that managers with sophisticated institutional clients should 
outperform. The next subsections briefly explore the robustness and persistence of these results. 
  
3.3. Client type analyses 
                                                          
 
29 While the economic magnitude of this estimate appears small compared to the differences in performance illustrated 
by the fund sorts in Table 3, a piecewise specification in Table 10 of Section 5 shows that this estimate is smaller 
because there is little benefit to increases in institutional clients once they make up at least one-quarter of the adviser’s 
total clients. 
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This section addresses the robustness of the construction of the measure of institutional 
clientele. I replace %Inst. Clients with various client types on Form ADV as the explanatory 
variables of interest in the main regression specification. I also investigate if the results are 
consistent with predictions in the Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018) model on relative clientele 
sophistication and performance, i.e. does the composition of the adviser’s direct separate account 
clients matter for the relationship? According to the Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018) model, there 
should be no significant differences in mutual fund performance predicted by an increased 
presence of direct individual or high net worth individual clients. Panel A of Table 5 considers the 
following client types as explanatory variables: individuals, high net worth individuals, private 
funds, and pure institutions (%Public + %Corporate + %Charity). In the Gârleanu and Pedersen 
(2018) model, noise allocators are assumed to be individuals. Thus, it would be expected that their 
presence has no association with fund performance. Since search costs are associated with capital 
levels, it could be argued that the presence of high net worth individual separate account investors 
may be more positively associated with performance than that of individuals. As predicted by the 
model, the presence of institutional clients should be positively related to fund performance and 
robust to the exclusion of private funds in the baseline measure. Since private fund shareholders 
can be institutions or high net worth individuals, it is theoretically ambiguous whether their 
presence would be positive and significantly associated with performance. 
In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, the coefficient estimates on the adviser’s percentage of 
individual and high net worth individual clients are negative and positive respectively, but not 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the notion that individuals are noise allocators in 
the Gârleanu and Pedersen (2018) model. In column (3), the presence of private funds is positively 
associated with mutual fund performance, and the coefficient estimate is statistically significant at 
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the 5% level. In column (4), the coefficient estimate shows that the presence of pure institutions is 
positively associated with mutual fund 4-factor alpha and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Panel B further breaks out institutional clientele by types to examine which types of 
institutions drive the main results. Column (1) examines state or municipal government entities 
(%Public), Column (2) examines corporations or other businesses (%Corporate), column (3) 
examines charitable organizations (%Charity), and column (4) examines pension or profit sharing 
plans (%Pension Plans) as explanatory variables. Recall that pension plans are excluded 
from %Inst. Clients to avoid double counting of clients (e.g., CalPERS is both a public and pension 
plan client). In Panel B, coefficient estimates for three out of the four institutional client types are 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Corporations or other businesses are the only 
institutional client type whose coefficient estimate is not statistically significant. This finding is 
consistent with the search costs hypothesis. Specifically, Goyal and Wahal (2008) note that public 
pension plans are much more likely to retain investment consultants to assist in manager search 
efforts than corporate pension plans at 82% versus 50% respectively.  
Taken together, the estimates in Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 indicate the main results 
are not driven by only one client type and are consistent with the empirical predictions of Gârleanu 
and Pedersen on how client sophistication and performance should relate. Furthermore, the results 
show that the composition of an adviser’s underlying separate account investors matters. While 
greater percentages of pension plan, government, and charitable organization clients are associated 
with better mutual fund performance, a greater presence of individuals and high net worth 
individuals are not. 
 
3.4. How long do differences in performance persist? 
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The baseline tests provide evidence that significant differences in performance are realized 
by institutional and retail-oriented advisers over the course of the subsequent calendar year, but 
how long do these differences persist? Do mutual fund investors eventually locate institutional-
oriented adviser’s mutual funds and erode the differences in performance via fund flows? Table 6 
addresses these questions by rerunning the baseline tests with prior lags of institutional clientele 
to determine how far in advance differences in clientele predict significant differences in 
performance. I consider lagged institutional clientele of up to five years in advance of the realized 
performance. To enter the sample in each column, observations are required have data available 
on lagged clientele for all five prior years. 
The results in Table 6 reveal that differences in mutual fund performance realized by 
institutional and retail-oriented advisers persist for at least four years into the future as lags 
of %Inst. Clients of the order of four predict significant differences in realized mutual fund 
performance in column (4) of Table 6. The economic magnitudes and t-stats of the coefficients on 
lagged %Inst. Clients decay over time from column (1) to column (5) which suggests that the 
mutual fund market eventually reaches equilibrium and returns to efficiency. I find that the 
coefficient on the fifth lag of adviser institutional clientele is half of the magnitude of the first lag 
and is not statistically significant. The next section of this study aims to understand why mutual 
fund investors allow for these significant differences in performance to persist for so long. In 
particular, I offer evidence that differences in search efforts undertaken by institutional clients can 
help to explain this phenomenon. 
 
3.5. Other robustness tests of the main result 
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Prior to conducting tests for the search costs hypothesis, I conduct a battery of robustness 
tests on the main regression results. I briefly describe these tests in this section and provide much 
greater detail in Section 5 of this paper. The robustness tests are contained in Table 10. I show that 
the results hold for the subsamples of both retail and institutional mutual funds which is consistent 
with results not being driven by retail-oriented distribution channels (e.g., Del Guercio and Reuter 
2014). Further, I show that the results are robust to controlling for the adviser’s decision to pursue 
institutional clients by introducing an indicator variable into the analyses that is equal to one 
if %Inst. Clients is equal to zero and zero otherwise. I find results are robust to the use of band 
midpoints on Form ADV by reconstructing %Inst. Clients using band maximums and minimums 
as opposed to midpoints. I control for the geography of the adviser by demonstrating that the 
baseline results hold when comparing the performance of advisers operating the same metropolitan 
statistical areas. Findings are relatively unchanged when excluding the financial crisis years (i.e., 
2008 and 2009). Lastly, I consider alternate regression methodologies and my inferences remain 
intact. Specifically, I re-estimate coefficients using median regression and Fama-MacBeth 
regression.  
 
4. Can costly search help to explain the differences in performance? 
 
This section tests if selection efforts and search costs incurred by institutional clientele help 
to account for the observed relationship between institutional clients and fund performance. My 
approach consists of two key sets of tests.  
First, I test whether differences in performance are more pronounced when institutional 
separate account investors hold an advantage in identifying investment managers over mutual fund 
shareholders. In particular, I show that the baseline results are stronger in mutual fund market 
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segments where prior literature has found that shareholders face higher search costs. The presence 
of institutional clients better predicts mutual fund performance among smaller mutual fund 
families, families with lower levels of marketing and distribution expenditures, and families with 
garnering less attention from the media. These are market segments where enhanced search efforts 
may yield the most benefit.  
Second, I present evidence that the institutional clients in my sample incur search costs. 
Specifically, I examine the operational characteristics and performance measures that institutional 
clients use to select managers. Operational characteristics that predict higher levels of institutional 
clients for mutual fund advisers are remarkably similar to those sought in institutional consultants’ 
and plan sponsors’ manager searches. This suggests that the institutional clients in the sample have 
likely retained investment professionals to conduct manager searches. Further consistent this 
notion, results from performance horserace tests show that institutional clients use more 
sophisticated measures of performance to allocate their capital than mutual fund investors. I find 
that changes in institutional clients tend to be best predicted by 3-factor or 4-factor alphas while 
mutual fund flows are better predicted by CAPM alphas.  
  
4.1. The impact of search costs on differences in returns  
This section examines whether the differences in performance realized by institutional and 
retail-oriented advisers are stronger (weaker) when mutual fund investors face higher (lower) 
search costs. I follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) to identify mutual fund market segments where 
search costs are higher. Sirri and Tufano identify three proxies for search costs: a fund family’s 
size/visibility, marketing and distribution expenditures, and media coverage. In constructing all 
three proxies, I aggregate data to the family level since findings in prior work show that there are 
spillovers in the effects marketing and media coverage on flows of funds operating the same 
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family.30 Mutual fund families in the CRSP database are identified using the mgmt._cd variable. 
Wherever possible, I fill in missing values of this variable for observations where the name of the 
management company is available.  
To proxy for fund family size/visibility, I directly follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) and use 
the lagged natural log of aggregate fund family net assets. For marketing and distribution 
expenditures, I isolate fund fees attributable to these activities.31 Specifically, I focus on 12b-1 
fees and load fees. On an annual basis, I calculate the natural log of the dollar value of marketing 
and distribution expenses incurred by the family’s fund shareholders. CRSP provides information 
on both actual 12b-1 fees and loads for every share class of each fund. Following Sirri and Tufano, 
loads are assumed to be amortized over a seven-year holding period. At the end of each calendar 
year, I multiply total net assets by the most recently available amortized load fees and 12b-1 fees 
at the share class level for each fund and aggregate these quantities to the family level. Share class 
level data are used since loads and 12b-1 fees can vary substantially across different share classes 
of the same fund. 
Lastly, I identify a measure of media attention for mutual fund families. I follow a recent 
study by Kaniel and Parham (2017) who identify a relatively exogenous source of mutual fund 
media attention.32 They focus on funds featured in the Wall Street Journal’s quarterly lists of 
“Category Kings.” These lists are comprised of funds with the ten best trailing 12-month returns 
                                                          
 
30 For example, Kaniel and Parham (2017) find that positive media coverage of a single fund affects flows for the 
entire family. 
31 In contrast, Sirri and Tufano use total fees (amortized loads and total expense ratios) to proxy for distribution and 
marketing effort in their tests. 
32 Sirri and Tufano (1998) rely on Lexis/Nexis searches of fund name mentions in major periodicals and newspapers 
and show a limited effect of media attention on fund flows. 
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in their Lipper classification groups.33 I follow the authors’ methodology to replicate these lists 
using returns, assets, and Lipper classification group data contained in CRSP.34 The replicated 
lists are used to create an indicator variable equal to one if a fund’s family has had a fund featured 
as a “Category King” in the past 24 months and zero otherwise. I choose a period of 24 months 
because families with funds that make the lists may enter mutual fund investors’ choice set (i.e., 
search costs are reduced) for a period after being featured in the WSJ.35  
Table 7 presents the results from regressions that introduce the three measures of search 
costs. In columns (2), (3), and (4), I examine how each search cost proxy interacts with %Inst. 
Clients. I first note that the magnitudes of the coefficients on %Inst. Clients in columns (2), (3) 
and (4) are economically larger than in the baseline specification in column (1). This suggests 
differences in performance realized by institutional and retail-oriented advisers are greater when 
mutual fund investors face higher search costs. For example, in column (4), a 1% increase in 
institutional clientele is associated with a 1.8 basis point increase in fund alphas in the segment of 
the mutual fund industry that has not received recent coverage in the WSJ. The magnitude of this 
coefficient is 63% larger than the coefficient on %Inst. Clients in column (1) in the baseline 
specification.  
Coefficients on the interaction terms between %Inst. Clients and the search cost proxies in 
all three columns are negative and statistically significant at the 10% level or better. This suggests 
that differences in mutual fund performance realized by institutional and retail-oriented advisers 
                                                          
 
33 The identification in their study comes from the discontinuity in flows observed between the 10th ranked fund and 
the 11th ranked fund which just missed making the list. 
34 I focus on the same 12 Lipper classification as Kaniel and Parham (2017) that appear in each WSJ issue. Kaniel 
and Parham indicate that their replication methodology yields approximately a 90% success rate (9 out of 10 funds on 
average) in recreating the lists. To extent that errors occur in my replication of the lists, this would bias against finding 
results. See Appendix A for further detail on the list construction. 
35 I find that results are economically similar, albeit not statistically significant, if I use a trailing period of 12 months 
to construct the indicator variable. 
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are mitigated when search costs are reduced for mutual fund investors, i.e. when fund families are 
larger, marketing and distribution expenditures are greater, and when a family garners media 
coverage. In columns (2) and (3), the interaction terms between %Inst. Clients and family size and 
marketing expenditures are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level or better with the 
strongest effect both economically and statistically coming from family marketing and distribution 
expenditures. Arguably, the dollar value of marketing and distribution expenditures for a family 
should have the greatest effect in reducing search costs for mutual fund investors of the three 
proxies since this directly measures resources allocated to increasing brand awareness. Overall, 
the results from these tests support the search costs hypothesis that observed differences in 
performance realized by institutional and retail-oriented advisers can be attributed, in part, to 
search costs incurred by institutional clients. 
 
 
4.2. Institutional manager search and the determinants of mutual fund adviser clientele 
I next examine whether there is evidence that the institutional clients in the sample engage 
in heightened manager search activities. Because it is difficult to measure search costs incurred by 
an adviser’s institutional clients directly, I focus on which adviser characteristics determine 
institutional clients’ presence for mutual fund advisers. In particular, if the search costs hypothesis 
contributes to the outperformance of institutional-oriented advisers, it would be expected that 
institutional client presence would be correlated with other adviser characteristics sought by 
consultants and investment professionals in the investment manager due diligence process.  
While search costs incurred by institutional plan sponsors can take on many forms, often 
investment consultants are retained to assist in the manager search and due diligence process. 
Typically, the first step in the manager search process involves the review of firm and product 
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information provided to consultants by investment advisers in the form of requests for proposal 
(RFPs) or due diligence questionnaires (DDQs). I review publicly available RFPs and DDQs as 
well as DDQs embedded within consultant databases (i.e., eVestment Alliance, Informa/PSN, 
Wilshire, Callan, Cambridge, etc.) to understand the information that consultants and plan 
sponsors use in the manager screening process. 
Importantly, a substantial portion of due diligence efforts focus on understanding the 
adviser’s conflicts of interest, incentives, and operational risk.36 For example, a common line of 
questioning asks if the adviser is independent or has any financial industry affiliates, particularly 
a related broker-dealer which could affect the execution quality of securities transactions. 
Questionnaires also typically inquire about the ownership structure of the adviser, particularly if 
the adviser has employee ownership which could speak to long-term portfolio manager incentives 
and the adviser’s ability to retain talent. Another common line of questioning requests information 
concerning past legal or regulatory violations of the adviser, and the adviser’s ability to prevent 
future violations. For example, many RFPs ask if the adviser’s key officer responsible for detecting 
and preventing securities law violations, the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO), has other 
operational duties (e.g., Portfolio Manager, Chief Operating Officer, etc.) that could detract from 
or compromise their ability to detect securities laws violations. Lastly, consultants typically inquire 
if the adviser presents their separate account performance in accordance with the Global 
Investment Performance Standards (GIPS). GIPS are a set of performance presentation standards 
                                                          
 
36  I also find that consultants typically request information on product and adviser performance, the portfolio 
management team and their investment process, assets and accounts under management, and holdings. 
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governed by the CFA Institute that facilitate the evaluation of manager performance and allow for 
comparability of performance across products and firms.37 
Much of the operational information requested by consultants in RFPs/DDQs is disclosed 
on the investment adviser’s Form ADV. For example, Items 6 and 7 include information about the 
adviser’s other lines of business and financial industry affiliates. Schedule A provides information 
on the ownership structure of the firm and the names and titles of the firm’s officers, including the 
Chief Compliance Officer. Item 11 discloses information on past legal and regulatory violations 
both for the firm and its advisory affiliates (employees and other firms). A list of advisers claiming 
compliance with GIPS is obtained from the CFA Institute’s website.38 These data are used to 
examine whether the adviser’s operational characteristics related to institutional search costs are 
associated with significantly different percentages of institutional clientele for mutual fund 
investment advisers. For details on the construction of each variable see Appendix A. 
Table 8 presents the results of Tobit and OLS regressions of the adviser’s percentage of 
institutional clientele on RFP/DDQ operational characteristics and controls. I focus primarily on 
the Tobit estimates since %Inst. Clients is bounded from below at zero, but also present OLS 
estimates for robustness. Regressions are at the adviser level and include year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered on investment adviser. In addition to using the previously mentioned 
RFP/DDQ operational characteristics as explanatory variables, I also include the adviser controls 
used in Table 4.39  
                                                          
 
37 For example, GIPS prevents firms from cherry picking their best performing accounts and time periods to present 
performance. GIPS also requires sufficient disclosures to properly evaluate a product’s performance such as the 
number of accounts and assets in the composite and past benchmark changes, etc. 
38 This list is a snapshot as of May 2016. I backfill data on GIPS compliance for prior years in the sample. 
39 These include the natural log of asset under management for the investment adviser (Log(AUM)), the natural log of 
the number of accounts managed by the investment adviser (Log(Accts)), whether the adviser charges performance-
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Results from Table 8 reveal that all RFP/DDQ operational characteristics considered are 
associated with significant differences in an adviser’s percentage of institutional clients. 
Coefficient estimates show that independent advisers, larger advisers (AUM), advisers with direct 
employee ownership, advisers with a CCO dedicated to the legal/compliance function, and 
advisers claiming compliance with GIPS all have significantly higher percentages of institutional 
clients. The estimates also show that advisers related to a brokerage firm, advisers reporting prior 
legal/regulatory violations on Item 11 of Form ADV, and advisers who engage in agency cross 
trading all have significantly lower percentages of institutional clients. Taken together, the results 
establish that mutual fund advisers’ institutional client presence appears to be related to search 
costs incurred by plan sponsors via the investment consultant RFP/DDQ process. 
 
4.3. Factor model preferences of institutional clients  
Next, I continue testing whether institutional clients better identify manager skill by 
examining their factor model preferences. While investment consultant RFPs and DDQs suggest 
that the institutional manager search process extends beyond simply assessing past product 
performance, prior studies have established that performance plays a significant role in the hiring 
and termination of investment managers by institutional plan sponsors. If institutional plan 
sponsors and/or their consultants are more discerning in their selection and termination of 
investment managers than mutual fund investors, it would be expected that changes in an adviser’s 
institutional client base would be more closely related to the alphas of multi-factor models as 
                                                          
 
based fees (Performance Fees), and whether the adviser engages in agency cross-trading of client account (Agency 
Cross Trade). I use separate specifications for the Independent variable (Column (1)) and the other financial industry 
affiliations (i.e., Related Brokerage, Related Bank, and Related Insurance) because there is overlap in the ADV items 
used in their construction. 
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opposed to the CAPM model.40 I use the adviser’s mutual fund performance to proxy for the 
performance of its institutional products. It is likely that institutional separate accounts and mutual 
funds managed by the same investment adviser would realize highly correlated performance as 
they tend to share common trading desks, research analysts, and portfolio managers. Consistent 
with this notion, I find that past mutual fund performance is positively associated with changes in 
institutional clients for the investment adviser. Subsequently I use horserace tests to establish 
which factor model(s) institutional clients respond to most closely.41  
Like the RFP/DDQ analyses, I use annual data since changes in institutional clientele on 
Form ADV are measured on an annual basis. Panel A regresses the change in %Inst. Clients 
(∆%Inst. Clients) in year t on each fund’s risk-adjusted performance realized in year t-1. Column 
(1) examines CAPM alpha, column (2) considers 3-factor alpha, column (3) uses 4-factor alpha, 
and column (4) examines 6-factor alpha. Each regression includes year-by-objective fixed effects, 
fund and adviser controls from Table 4, and standard errors are clustered on adviser.42   
Results in Panel A of Table 9 show that coefficient estimates on 3-factor, 4-factor, and 6-
factor alpha are all positive and significantly associated with future changes in the institutional 
clientele of the investment adviser. All three coefficient estimates are significant at the 1% level 
or better. In contrast, the coefficient estimate on CAPM alpha in column (1) is not statistically 
significant. The results indicate that institutional investors tend to consider the alpha of models 
                                                          
 
40 Barber, Huang and Odean (2016) and Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) find that mutual fund flows, on average, are 
more sensitive to CAPM alpha than the alphas from models with additional factors.  
41 Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012) also conduct flow-performance tests for the institutional clients in their sample. They 
find that, consistent with prior findings made by Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), that institutional clients tend to punish 
poor-risk adjusted performance. However, these tests do not statistically differentiate between preferences for certain 
performance measures. 
42 I omit the second cluster on time because there are only 13 years in the sample. I include the level of %Inst. Clients 
as a control variable in these tests because many RFPs and DDQs express interest in understanding the make-up 
adviser’s client base. For example, advisers with no institutional clients may have more difficulty adding institutional 
clients than a firm with 20% institutional clients. Likewise, advisers with no institutional clients cannot have negative 
changes in institutional clients. 
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that include size and value as risk factors. This is consistent with Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) 
who mention that plan sponsors tend to use equity managers to fill style mandates. Mandates for 
domestic equity managers are typically partitioned into categories focusing on market 
capitalization (i.e., small, mid, large) and value/growth styles.  
In Panel B of Table 9, formal horserace tests are used to examine if institutional client 
preferences for multi-factor model alphas are statistically different than those of the CAPM model. 
Tests are conducted in the spirit of those used in a recent study by Barber, Huang and Odean (2016), 
who test for differences in mutual fund investor factor model preferences.43 As in Panel A, I 
consider CAPM, 3-factor, 4-factor, and 6-factor model alphas. For each pairwise factor model 
comparison, I estimate the following regression between changes in institutional clientele and a 
fund’s decile ranking based on two competing models: 
 
, , , , , 1 , , 1 , ,% _ i j t kl kl i j t i j t i j tk lInst Clients a b D cX Year Objective ε− −∆ = + + + × +∑ ∑  .     (2) 
 
Where the dependent variable is the adviser’s change in institutional clientele for over year 
t Dkl,i,t-1,t-12 is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if fund i is in decile k based on the 
first model and decile l based on the second model over the prior year. I include the same fund and 
adviser control variables as in Table 4. I also include year-by-investment objective fixed effects 
and standard errors are clustered on investment adviser. The key coefficients of interest are bkl, k 
= 1, …,10, and l = 1, …, 10, which can be interpreted as the percentage change in the adviser’s 
                                                          
 
43 Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) produce contemporaneous work which also assesses investors’ asset pricing model 
preferences. The focus is on the Barber, Huang and Odean (2016) test because their tests seek to discern among 
investors’ sophistication. Further, their tests allow for non-linearities in the flow-performance relationship as well as 
controls. As evidenced in my review of RFP/DDQs and the associated tests, the institutional manager evaluation 
extends beyond product performance. Thus, the ability to control for other adviser and fund characteristics is critical.  
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institutional clients for a fund in alpha decile k for the first model and alpha decile l for the second 
model relative to the fund that ranks in the fifth decile based on the alphas from both models. Each 
pair of coefficients bkl and blk can be tested to see whether institutional clients are more sensitive 
to the alpha estimated from the first model or the second model. For each pairwise comparison of 
alphas from two models, 45 such comparisons can be made. I test the null hypothesis that the 
summed difference across all 45 comparisons is equal to zero, and I also calculate a binomial test 
statistic which tests the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive differences is equal to 50%. 
Panel B of Table 9 presents the results of the factor model horserace tests for the 
institutional clientele of mutual fund investment advisers. The results indicate that institutional 
clients prefer 3-factor and 4-factor alpha to CAPM alpha. For these comparisons, made in rows 1 
and 2, the summed differences in coefficient estimates in Column (1) are significant at 1% level 
for 4-factor alpha and the 10% level for 3-factor alpha relative to CAPM alpha. In column (2), 
binomial test statistics indicate that the proportion of positive differences are statistically different 
from 50% at the 5% level or better in both cases. While the horserace tests confirm institutional 
clients’ preference for the alphas of multi-factor models relative to the CAPM model, the results 
unfortunately do not produce significant differences in preferences between 3-factor, 4-factor, and 
6-factor alphas. Nonetheless, since recent work suggests that mutual fund investors prefer CAPM 
alpha to the alphas of more sophisticated models, the results speak to heightened sophistication in 
manager evaluation among institutional plan sponsors relative to mutual fund investors.  
In Table 11 of Section 5, I use the Barber, Huang, and Odean (2016) horserace tests to 
confirm mutual fund investors in my sample prefer CAPM alpha, i.e. are less sophisticated than 
institutional clients in my sample. Further, I undertake a tercile split of the sample by %Inst. Clients 
and find that mutual fund investors of both institutional and retail-oriented advisers prefer CAPM 
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alpha to the alpha of models with a greater number of factors. This is consistent with the 
outperformance of mutual funds managed by institutional-oriented advisers resulting from 
identification of manager skill by institutional clients as opposed to mutual fund shareholders. 
 
5. Additional tests 
5.1. Further discussion of robustness checks of the main regression results 
Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012) use institutional mutual funds designated by Morningstar, 
in addition to separate account composites, to identify institutional clients managed side-by-side 
with retail mutual funds. Since institutional mutual funds are used in their identification strategy, 
this leaves an open question as to whether institutional mutual funds benefit from being managed 
side-by-side with institutional separate account clients and/or private funds. In columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 10, I partition the sample into retail and institutional mutual funds. Following Evans and 
Fahlenbrach (2012), I categorize funds that receive any assets from retail share classes as retail, 
and funds receiving only assets from institutional share classes as institutional. The results in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 show that both retail mutual funds and institutional mutual funds 
managed by institutional-oriented advisers outperform peers. Both coefficient estimates are similar 
in magnitude to the baseline estimates in Table 4 and are statistically significant at the 1% level or 
better. Since the results are also significant in the sample of institutional funds, this alleviates 
concerns that the baseline results may be driven by differences in retail channels mutual fund of 
distribution (i.e., Del Guercio and Reuter 2014). 
Next, I examine the nature of the functional form of the relationship between institutional 
clients and mutual fund performance. Prior studies in the side-by-side literature (e.g. Evans and 
Fahlenbrach 2012 and Del Guercio, Genc, and Tran 2018) tend to use an indicator variable to 
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capture the presence of institutional vehicles (i.e., institutional mutual funds, private funds and/or 
separate accounts), whereas the results in this study suggest that there exists an increasing 
relationship between the quantity of institutional clients relative to retail clients and performance. 
In column (4) of Table 10, I examine a piecewise linear specification. The results from initial sorts 
in Table 3 suggest the possibility that the relationship between an adviser’s percentage of 
institutional clients and mutual fund performance is not linear. The nature of the non-linearity is 
intuitive. For example, a five percentage point change in institutional clients would likely have 
different implications for an adviser managing 5% institutional clients relative to an adviser 
managing 50% institutional clients. If search costs are the channel for outperformance, it could be 
argued that a five percentage point change in institutional clients for an adviser already managing 
a client base consisting of 50% institutional clients may not matter for performance since sufficient 
manager vetting has likely already occurred. The piecewise linear specification allows for different 
slopes on %Inst. Clients for advisers with less than 25% institutional clients (Low %Inst. Clients), 
between 25% and 50% institutional clients (Med %Inst. Clients), and greater than 50% institutional 
clients (High %Inst. Clients).44  
The results in column (4) show that the relationship between institutional clients and 
mutual fund performance is driven entirely by differences in adviser clientele between 1% and 
25%. The coefficient estimate on the Low %Inst. Clients variable is significant at the 5% level or 
better in both columns. Economically, the coefficient estimate in column (4) amounts to a 3.2 basis 
point increase in annual 4-factor alpha for every percentage point increase in institutional clientele 
                                                          
 
44 The formula for the low institutional clients variable is Low %Inst. Clients = Min(25, %Inst. Clients), the formula 
for medium institutional clients is Med %Inst. Clients = Min(25, %Inst. Clients – Low %Inst. Clients), and the formula 
for high institutional clients is High %Inst. Clients = %Inst. Clients – Med %Inst. Clients – Low %Inst. Clients. 
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between 1% and 25%. In contrast, the medium and high institutional client coefficients are not 
statistically significant.   
This framework also allows for me to control for an adviser’s choice to pursue institutional 
clients with an indicator variable equal to one if %Inst. Clients equals zero and zero otherwise 
(%Inst. Clients = 0) in column (3).45  The results in column (4) of Table 10 show that the baseline 
results hold with the introduction of the %Inst. Clients = 0 indicator variable. This suggests that 
results are not driven by the adviser’s choice to pursue institutional clients. Overall, the results 
from these two tests suggest that the relationship is not driven by the adviser’s decision to pursue 
institutional clients and that once a sufficient level of manager vetting has occurred (i.e., 
institutional clients make up at least a quarter of the adviser’s client base) there are no additional 
benefits associated with higher percentages of institutional clientele. 
Recall from the description of the data in Section 2 that band midpoints are used to infer 
the presence of each client type from Form ADV data. Columns (5) and (6) reconstruct %Inst. 
Clients using band minimums and maximums (respectively) for each client type to ensure that 
baseline results are not influenced by this choice. The magnitude and statistical significance of 
coefficient estimates in columns (5) and (6) are similar to the baseline results in Table 4 suggesting 
that the use of band midpoints to infer Form ADV client presence does not drive the baseline 
results.  
Prior literature shows that mutual fund manager location influences investment decisions 
(e.g. Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker, 2015; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). Further, Hong, Kubik and 
Stein (2005) document that the mutual fund industry is concentrated in a few metropolitan 
                                                          
 
45 Evans and Fahlenbrach (2012) use a Heckman correction to address this choice. Del Guercio Genc, and Tran (2018) 
do not address this issue. 
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statistical areas (MSAs), namely New York and Boston. If institutional-oriented advisers are more 
concentrated in these markets relative to retail-oriented advisers, they may have better access to 
skilled labor, i.e., analysts and portfolio managers. To account for this possibility, I introduce a 
model specification which includes MSA fixed effects in column (7) to compare the performance 
of funds operating in the same geographical area and find that the results are similar. 
Next, I ensure that my results are not driven by the financial crisis years. Related to this 
possibility, Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2013) find that some mutual fund 
managers can market time recessions in a skillful manner to help generate abnormal returns. 
Column (8) of Table 10 reruns baseline tests excluding the 2008 and 2009 calendar years to ensure 
the results are present in all types of market conditions. Coefficient estimate on %Inst. Clients in 
column (8) remains virtually unchanged when excluding the 2008 and 2009 calendar years.  
Lastly, I consider alternate regression specifications. In column (9), I compute coefficients using 
a median regression, and in column (10) I tabulate results using Fama-MacBeth regression. In both 
cases, the results remain economically and statistically similar to the baseline results.  
 
5.2. Factor model preferences of mutual fund investors in the sample 
In Table 11, I check whether factor model horserace tests (following Barber, Huang, and 
Odean 2016) can confirm that mutual fund investors are less sophisticated than institutional clients 
in my sample. In the horserace tests, I consider CAPM, 3-factor, 4-factor, and 6-factor model 
alphas. For each pairwise comparison, I estimate the following regression between mutual fund 
flows and a fund’s decile ranking based on two competing models: 
 
, , , , , 1, 12 , , 1 , ,i j t kl kl i j t t i j t i j tk l
Flow a b D cX Month Objective ε− − −= + + + × +∑ ∑  .     (3) 
 
47 
 
 
 
Where the dependent variable is the fund flows for mutual fund i in month t. Dkl,i,t-1,t-12 is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if fund i is in decile k based on the first model and 
decile l based on the second model over the previous 12 months. I include the same fund and 
adviser control variables as in Table 9. I also include month-by-investment objective fixed effects 
and standard errors are clustered on month and investment adviser. The key coefficients of interest 
are bkl, k = 1, …,10, and l = 1, …, 10, these can be interpreted as the percentage of flows received 
by a fund in alpha decile k for the first model and alpha decile l for the second model relative to a 
fund that ranks in the fifth decile based on the alphas from both models. I test each pair of 
coefficients bkl and blk to examine whether investors are more responsive to the alpha estimated 
from the first model or the second model. I make 45 such comparisons using this pairwise 
comparison approach from the two models. Specifically, Table 11 presents results from tests that 
the null hypothesis that the summed difference across all 45 comparisons is equal to zero for each 
model pair. Table 11 also presents a binomial test statistic which tests the null hypothesis that the 
proportion of positive differences is equal to 50%. 
Further, I use these horserace tests to help confirm that the results are not driven by 
differences in mutual fund investor sophistication (i.e., the mutual fund investors of institutional-
oriented adviser are more sophisticated) by undertaking a tercile split of the sample of advisers 
by %Inst. Clients. Specifically, I run the horserace tests separately for each tercile to check whether 
the mutual fund investors of institutional-oriented advisers prefer more sophisticated risk-adjusted 
measures of performance to CAPM alpha.  
Table 11 presents the results of the model horserace tests for funds in the full sample as 
well as in each tercile based on the investment adviser’s percentage of institutional clientele. The 
results indicate that mutual fund investors in the entire sample as well as each tercile are most 
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responsive to fund performance based on CAPM alpha compared to the alphas other models. The 
summed differences are all significantly positive (at the 5% level or better) for all the pairwise 
comparisons between CAPM alphas and the alphas from the three other models. The results 
suggest that the mutual fund investors of institutional-oriented advisers are, on average, of similar 
sophistication as the mutual fund investors of retail-oriented advisers. This is consistent with the 
outperformance of mutual funds managed by institutional-oriented advisers resulting from 
identification of manager skill by institutional clients as opposed to mutual fund shareholders. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper explores how the composition of an investment advisory firm’s clientele relates 
to mutual fund performance. Consistent with the empirical predictions of the Gârleanu and 
Pedersen (2018) model, institutional-oriented advisers realize economically and statistically 
superior risk-adjusted mutual fund performance relative to retail-oriented advisers. Mutual funds 
managed by advisers whose client base is made up of at least 25% institutional clients outperform 
funds whose adviser has no institutional clients by approximately 80 basis points annually as 
measured by 4-factor alpha.  
Subsequent tests offer evidence that the relationship between client sophistication and fund 
returns can be accounted for, at least in part, by Gârleanu and Pedersen’s mechanism. Namely, 
more sophisticated clients identify variation in adviser skill by incurring search costs. I find that 
the relationship is more pronounced in mutual fund market segments where mutual fund investors 
face higher search costs. These segments include: smaller fund families, families with lower 
marketing and distribution expenditures, and families garnering less media attention. I next 
conduct tests to demonstrate that the institutional clients in my sample exhibit more discerning 
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behavior in their selection investment management firms. First, I show that the presence of 
institutional clients for mutual fund investment advisers can be predicted by operational 
characteristics sought by institutional investment consultants in the manager search and screening 
process. This is consistent with institutional investors hiring investment professionals (i.e., 
incurring search costs) to conduct manager search. Second, I find that institutional clients in my 
sample use more sophisticated risk-adjusted measures of performance than the adviser’s mutual 
fund shareholders in making investment decisions (i.e., 3-factor or 4-factor alpha as opposed to 
CAPM alpha).  
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Appendix A. Definition and Data Source of Variables 
Variable Name Data Source Variable Definition and Construction 
1. Mutual Fund Variables 
CAPM, 3-factor, 4-
factor, and 6-factor 
alpha 
CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database and Ken 
French’s website 
The difference between the fund’s realized monthly 
excess return in month t and the fund’s model benchmark 
return estimated for month t. Fund returns are TNA 
weighted share class returns aggregated using the 
crsp_cl_grp variable. Model benchmark returns are 
estimated from the CAPM, 3-factor, 4-factor, or 6-factor 
models with factor loadings estimated over the previous 
24 months and month t factor realizations. The CAPM 
model uses only the market (Mkt-RF) factor. The 3-
factor model adds the size (SMB), value (HML) factors 
to the CAPM model. The 4-factor model adds 
momentum (MOM) to the 3-factor model. The 6-factor 
model adds the investment (CMA) and profitability 
(RMW) factors to the 4-factor model. Annual and 12-
month alphas are calculated by cumulating monthly 
alphas over the requisite time period. 
Log(TNA) CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
Natural log of the aggregate TNA of each of the fund’s 
share classes. Share classes are aggregated using the 
crsp_cl_grp variable. 
Log(Age) CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
Natural log of the number of years (months/12) between 
the current month and the month the fund’s oldest share 
class was first offered in CRSP (first_offer_dt). 
Net Flows CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
Sum of the net monthly fund flows (as a percent of TNA) 
over the past 12 months. Monthly flows are calculated as 
[TNAt – (1+rt)*TNAt-1]/ TNAt-1. 
Std Flows CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
Standard deviation of net monthly fund flows (as a 
percent of TNA) over the past 12 months.  Monthly 
flows are calculated as [TNAt – (1+rt)*TNAt-1]/ TNAt-1. 
Turnover CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
The fund’s lagged annual portfolio turnover. Turnover is 
TNA weighted across share classes in CRSP using the 
crsp_cl_grp variable. 
Expense CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
The fund’s lagged annual expense ratio. Expense ratios 
are TNA weighted across share classes in CRSP using 
the crsp_cl_grp variable. 
I Share CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
The fraction of fund assets derived from institutional 
share classes. Institutional share classes for funds are 
identified via the institutional fund flag in CRSP. 
Closed CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
Indicator variable equal to one if all fund share classes 
are not open to new investors as identified in CRSP and 
zero otherwise. 
Outsourced CRSP Mutual Fund Database and Form ADV 
Indicator variable equal to one if the fund is outsourced 
and zero otherwise. A fund is designated as outsourced if 
none of the fund’s sub-advisers are affiliated with the 
fund’s investment adviser per the adviser’s most recent 
annual amendment to Form ADV. Affiliation data for 
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each adviser are disclosed on Item 7A. of schedule D.  
2. Investment Adviser Variables 
%Inst. Clients Form ADV 
Percentage of institutional clients managed by the fund’s 
investment adviser. Calculated as the sum of the 
midpoints of Items 5D.(1)(f), 5D.(h), 5D.(1)(i), and 
5D.(1)(j) on Form ADV. These are the percentages of 
adviser clients consisting of private funds, corporations, 
public entities, and charitable organizations. 
Log(AUM) Form ADV Natural log of assets under management of the fund’s investment adviser, Item 5F.(2)(c). 
Log(Accts) Form ADV Natural log of client accounts managed by the fund’s investment adviser, Item 5F.(2)(f). 
Related Brokerage Form ADV 
Indicator variable equal to one if the fund’s investment 
adviser indicates that it is a broker-dealer or is affiliated 
with an entity that is a broker-dealer and zero otherwise, 
Items 6A.(1) and 7A.(1) . 
Related Bank Form ADV 
Indicator variable equal to one if the fund’s investment 
adviser indicates that it is a commercial bank or trust 
company or is affiliated with an entity that is a 
commercial bank or trust company and zero otherwise, 
Items 6A.(7), 6A.(8),  7A.(8) and 7A.(9). 
Related Insurance Form ADV 
Indicator variable equal to one if the fund’s investment 
adviser indicates that it operates as an insurance 
company or is affiliated with and entity that operates as 
an insurance company, Items 6A.(6) and 7A.(12). 
Performance Fees Form ADV 
Indicator variable equal to one if the fund’s investment 
adviser indicates that it charges performance based fees 
on Form ADV and zero otherwise, Item 5E.(6). 
Agency Cross Trade Form ADV 
The extent to which the fund’s investment adviser 
engages in cross trading client accounts. An indicator 
variable equal to one if the adviser checks yes to Item 
8B.(2) on Form ADV and zero otherwise. 
Independent Form ADV 
Indicator variable equal to one if the adviser does not 
disclose any financial industry affiliates on Form ADV 
(i.e., does not check any boxes on Item 7) and zero 
otherwise. 
Employee Ownership Form ADV 
An indicator variable equal to one if the adviser has 
direct owners who are officers of the firm listed on 
Schedule A of Form ADV and zero otherwise. 
Specifically, I require that at least one officer has an 
ownership code of A, B, C, D, or E. 
Legal/Regulatory 
Issues Form ADV 
And indicator variable equal to one if the adviser 
discloses that it has past legal or regulatory violations 
(i.e., checks any boxes on Item 11) and zero otherwise.  
Dedicated CCO Form ADV 
An indicator variable equal to one if the adviser’s CCO 
has operational duties (i.e. Portfolio Manager, Chief 
Operating Officer, etc.) beyond a compliance/legal role 
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at the firm and zero otherwise. I use combination of text 
search and a manual review of job titles to construct this 
variable.  
GIPS Compliant CFA Institute Website 
I download a list of GIPS compliant advisers from the 
CFA Institute’s website. This list consists of advisers that 
have notified the CFA Institute that they are GIPS 
compliant. Data are as of May 2016 and backfilled for 
the entire sample period. 
MSA Form ADV 
MSAs are identified using postal zipcodes. Zipcodes for 
the fund’s adviser/sub-adviser are from Item 1F.(1) of the 
most recent annual amendment to Form ADV. 
3. Fund Family Search Cost Proxies 
Log(Family TNA) CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
Natural log of the aggregate total net assets of each fund 
in the family as calculated monthly. Fund families are 
identified using the mgmt._cd variable in CRSP. 
Wherever possible, I fill in missing values of this 
variable when the management company name is 
available. 
Log(Family Mkting 
Expense) 
CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database 
On an annual basis, I calculate the natural log of the 
dollar value of marketing and distribution expenses 
incurred by the family’s fund shareholders. CRSP 
provides information on both actual 12b-1 fees and loads 
for each fund. Following Sirri and Tufano, loads are 
assumed to be amortized over a seven-year holding 
period (i.e., annualized by dividing by seven). At the end 
of each calendar year, I multiply total net assets for each 
of the fund’s share classes by the most recently available 
amortized load fees and 12b-1 fees for the share class 
and aggregate these quantities to the family level. I use 
data at the individual share class level since loads and 
12b-1 fees can vary substantially across different share 
classes of the same fund. 
WSJ Category Kings CRSP Mutual Fund Database 
A dummy variable equal to one if the family has had a 
fund on one of the WSJ’s Category Kings lists in the past 
24 months and zero otherwise. To replicate the lists, I 
focus on the same 12 Lipper classifications as Kaniel and 
Parham (2017) that appear in the WSJ on a quarterly 
basis. These classifications include: Multi Cap Growth, 
Large Cap Growth, Mid Cap Growth, Small Cap Growth, 
Multi Cap Core, Large Cap Core, Mid Cap Core, Small 
Cap Core, Multi Cap Value, Large Cap Value, Mid Cap 
Value, and Small Cap Value. Each calendar quarter, I 
first keep the share class of each fund with the greatest 
total net assets. Next, I rank funds in each of these Lipper 
classification by their 12-month trailing returns. The 
quarterly Category Kings lists consist of the 120 funds 
that have the top ten trailing 12-month returns within 
their Lipper classification groups.  
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Appendix B. Sample Form ADV Filing, Item 5D.(1) 
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Appendix C. Sample List of Investment Advisers with Large Institutional Client Bases 
Investment adviser firm 
   
LSV Asset Management, LLC 
D.E. Shaw Investment Management, LLC 
Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo & Co., LLC 
Ridgeworth Capital Management, Inc. 
Aberdeen Asset Management, Inc. 
AQR Capital Management, LLC 
Bogle Investment Management, LP 
First Eagle Investment Management, LLC 
Cortina Asset Management, LLC 
Ariel Investments, LLC 
Profit Investment Management, LLC 
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Figure 1. Mutual Fund Adviser Institutional Clientele 2003-2015 
 
This figure presents annual means of %Inst. Clients. %Inst. Clients is the sum of the percentages of public, corporate, 
charity, and private fund clients for fund i’s investment adviser as of the end of the previous fiscal year. The adviser 
sample uses Form ADV data disclosed by each fund’s investment adviser. The sub-adviser sample uses Form ADV 
data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised, and excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Institutional Clientele for Mutual Fund Advisers 
 
This figure presents the distribution of %Inst. Clients for fund-month observations in 2003 and 2015. %Inst. Clients 
is the sum of the percentages of public, corporate, charity, and private fund clients for fund i’s investment adviser as 
of the end of the previous fiscal year. Panel A presents distributions for the adviser sample. The adviser sample uses 
Form ADV data disclosed by each fund’s investment adviser. Panel B presents distributions for the sub-adviser sample. 
The sub-adviser sample uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised, and 
excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser. 
 
Panel A: Adviser Sample 
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Table 1. Form ADV Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of investment adviser clientele and other Form ADV data for the sample of 
US actively managed equity funds from 2003 to 2015. It gives the number of observations, mean, median, standard 
deviation and 10th and 90th percentiles of fund-month observations. Statistics are given for all client types provided 
on Item 5D of Form ADV as well as a measure of an investment adviser’s percentage of institutional clientele. See 
Appendix A for definitions of other ADV variables. %Inst. Clients is the sum of the percentages of public, corporate, 
charity, and private fund clients for fund i’s investment adviser as of the previous fiscal year. The categories for 
investment advisers, insurance companies, and business development companies were added to Form ADV in 2010 
which explains the smaller sample sizes for these client types. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the adviser 
sample. The adviser sample uses Form ADV data disclosed by each fund’s investment adviser. Panel B presents 
descriptive statistics for the sub-adviser sample. The sub-adviser sample uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s 
sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised, and excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser. 
Panel A: Adviser Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES n mean median stdev p(10) p(90) 
       
Client Types       
%Inst. Clients 267,132 19.0% 15.0% 19.7% 0% 46.0% 
Individuals 267,132 18.5% 0% 31.1% 0% 87.5% 
HNW Individuals 267,132 11.5% 5.0% 19.6% 0% 38.0% 
Banks 267,132 2.0% 0% 5.2% 0% 5.0% 
Investment Companies 267,132 39.8% 18.0% 37.1% 5.0% 87.5% 
Business Development Co. 78,648 0.2% 0% 1.0% 0% 0% 
Public 267,132 3.5% 0% 6.6% 0% 5.0% 
Corporate 267,132 5.9% 5.0% 9.6% 0% 18.0% 
Pension Plans 267,132 9.1% 5.0% 14.1% 0% 38.0% 
Charitable Organizations 267,132 4.5% 5.0% 7.2% 0% 5.0% 
Private Funds 267,132 5.0% 5.0% 8.9% 0% 18.0% 
Investment Advisers 78,648 2.3% 0% 5.3% 0% 5.0% 
Insurance Companies 78,585 2.5% 0% 4.9% 0% 5.0% 
Other 267,132 3.4% 0% 9.7% 0% 5.0% 
       
Other ADV Information       
AUM ($MM)  267,057 86,657 26,700 149,911 766 239,348 
Number of Accounts 267,057 3,872 193 11,217 14 9,341 
Related Brokerage  267,132 0.83 1 0.37 0 1 
Related Bank 267,132 0.57 1 0.50 0 1 
Related Insurance  267,132 0.16 0 0.37 0 1 
Performance Fees 267,132 0.50 1 0.50 0 1 
Agency Cross Trade 267,132 0.26 0 0.44 0 1 
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Panel B: Sub-adviser Sample  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES n mean median stdev p(10) p(90) 
       
Client Types       
%Inst. Clients 234,115 23.9% 20.0% 19.7% 0% 53.0% 
Individuals 234,115 20.1% 0% 31.5% 0% 87.5% 
HNW Individuals 234,115 15.0% 5.0% 21.8% 0% 38.0% 
Banks 234,115 2.4% 0% 5.3% 0% 5.2% 
Investment Companies 234,115 30.2% 5.0% 33.1% 5.0% 87.5% 
Business Development Co. 68,371 0.2% 0% 1.1% 0% 0% 
Public 234,115 4.6% 5.0% 7.1% 0% 5.0% 
Corporate 234,115 7.4% 5.0% 10.1% 0% 18.0% 
Pension Plans 234,115 12.1% 5.0% 15.1% 0% 38.0% 
Charitable Organizations 234,115 6.0% 5.0% 7.6% 0% 18.0% 
Private Funds 234,115 6.1% 5.0% 9.6% 0% 18.0% 
Investment Advisers 68,347 2.1% 0% 4.8% 0% 5.0% 
Insurance Companies 68,308 3.4% 0% 5.2% 0% 5.0% 
Other 234,115 4.2% 0% 11.2% 0% 5.0% 
       
Other ADV Information       
AUM ($MM)  234,070 95,560 21,674 170,436 740 289,844 
Number of Accounts 234,070 4,959 320 13,862 18 12,957 
Related Brokerage 234,115 0.78 1 0.42 0 1 
Related Bank 234,115 0.50 0 0.50 0 1 
Related Insurance  234,115 0.14 0 0.37 0 1 
Performance Fees 234,115 0.60 1 0.50 0 1 
Agency Cross Trade 234,115 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 
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Table 2. Mutual Fund Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of US actively managed mutual funds from 2003 to 2015. It 
gives the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation and 10th and 90th percentiles of fund-month 
observations. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the adviser 
sample. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the sub-adviser sample. The sub-adviser sample uses Form ADV 
data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised, and excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser. 
Panel A: Adviser Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES n mean median stdev p(10) p(90) 
       
4f Alpha (%)  267,132 -0.06% -0.07% 1.46% -1.75% 1.63% 
Fund TNA ($MM) 267,132 1,176 238 2,785 22 2,826 
Age (years) 265,006 12.6 10.8 8.4 3.8 23.3 
Net Flows  265,969 0.03 -0.04 0.35 -0.30 0.46 
Std Flows  265,969 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.08 
Turnover  264,943 0.78 0.60 0.66 0.17 1.59 
Expense (%) 265,743 1.20% 1.18% 0.40% 0.75% 1.71% 
I Share  266,839 0.37 0.15 0.41 0 1 
Closed  267,132 0.04 0 0.20 0 0 
Outsourced 267,132 0.22 0 0.41 0 1 
 
Panel B: Sub-adviser Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES n mean median stdev p(10) p(90) 
       
4f Alpha (%)  234,115 -0.06% -0.07% 1.47% -1.78% 1.66% 
Fund TNA ($MM) 234,115 1,057 210 2,588 21 2,479 
Age (years) 232,269 12.5 10.8 8.3 3.8 22.9 
Net Flows  232,848 0.03 -0.04 0.36 -0.30 0.48 
Std Flows  232,848 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.08 
Turnover  232,106 0.76 0.58 0.67 0.16 1.58 
Expense (%) 232,735 1.21% 1.19% 0.41% 0.75% 1.72% 
I Share 233,839 0.37 0.14 0.41 0 1 
Closed  234,115 0.05 0 0.20 0 0 
Outsourced 234,115 0.12 0 0.32 0 1 
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Table 3. Mean Fund Characteristics Sorted by Investment Adviser Clientele 
 
This table reports sample means of fund characteristics for monthly fund observations sorted by lagged adviser/sub-
adviser clientele. Four-factor alphas are annualized by multiplying the mean monthly values by 12. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Panel A presents means for the adviser sample. The adviser sample uses 
Form ADV data disclosed by each fund’s investment adviser. Panel B presents summary means for the sub-adviser 
sample. The sub-adviser sample uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised, 
and excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser. Column (6) presents the differences in means between columns 
(5) and (1). Column (7) tests if the difference in means between observations in columns (5) and (1) is statistically 
different from zero. Standard errors are taken from univariate regressions and are clustered on investment adviser.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. 
Panel A: Adviser Sample Means 
 %Inst. Clients Range 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES  0 (0,10] (10,25] (25,50] >50 Diff 
(5) – (1) 
t-statistic 
        
Annual 4f Alpha (%)  -0.96% -0.79% -0.73% -0.40% -0.50% 0.46%** (2.08) 
Fund TNA ($MM) 940 1,489 997 1,331 1,192 252 (0.89) 
Age (years) 11.8 12.6 12.8 13.2 13.0 1.2 (1.45) 
Net Flows  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 (0.02) 
Std Flows  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.00 (1.12) 
Turnover  0.77 0.87 0.73 0.73 0.82 0.05 (0.78) 
Expense (%) 1.27% 1.22% 1.18% 1.16% 1.10% 0.17%*** (4.02) 
I Share  0.37 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.50 0.13** (2.13) 
Closed  0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04*** (3.54) 
Outsourced 0.35 0.34 0.10 0.10 0.15 -0.20*** (-3.83) 
N 59,233 62,795 71,423 48,369 21,030   
 
Panel B: Sub-adviser Sample Means 
 %Inst. Clients Range 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES  0 (0,10] (10,25] (25,50] >50 Diff 
(5) – (1) 
t-statistic 
        
Annual 4f Alpha (%)  -1.22% -1.01% -0.81% -0.40% -0.45% 0.77%*** (4.15) 
Fund TNA ($MM) 1,171 1,000 944 1,210 1,597 426 (0.77) 
Age (years) 12.4 12.0 12.6 12.8 13.0 0.6 (0.85) 
Net Flows  0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 (-1.29) 
Std Flows  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 (1.22) 
Turnover  0.75 0.82 0.73 0.75 0.86 0.11* (1.84) 
Expense (%) 1.29% 1.28% 1.19% 1.18% 1.13% 0.16%*** (3.76) 
I Share  0.27 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.15*** (3.07) 
Closed  0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03*** (4.28) 
Outsourced 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.58 0.53*** (8.75) 
N 32,365 35,646 83,561 59,053 56,507   
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Table 4. Panel Regressions of Mutual Fund Performance on Investment Adviser Clientele  
 
This table reports coefficients from the following panel regression model of fund i’s monthly alpha on fund and adviser 
characteristics: 
, , 0 1 , , 1 , , 1 , ,% .i j t i j t i j t i j tAlpha Inst Clients X Month Objectiveβ β β ε− −= + + + × +  
The sample is restricted to non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between January 2003 and 
December 2015. The performance measure in columns (1), (2), and (3) is 4-factor alpha which is a one-month ahead alpha 
calculated using an estimation window over the previous 24 months. The performance measure in column (4) is CAPM alpha 
which is a one-month ahead alpha calculated using an estimation window over the previous 24 months. The performance 
measure in column (6) is 6-factor alpha which is a one-month ahead alpha calculated using an estimation window over the 
previous 24 months. Regressions in columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) include fund and/or adviser control variables (see Appendix 
A for details). The key explanatory variable of interest is %Inst. Clients. This is the sum of the percentages of public, corporate, 
charity, and private fund clients for fund i’s investment adviser reported on Form ADV at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
For ease of interpretation, coefficients on %Inst. Clients are annualized by multiplying monthly estimates by 12. The sub-
adviser sample excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser and uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser 
if the fund is sub-advised. All regressions include month-by-investment objective fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
on investment adviser, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% 
levels. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 4-factor Alpha 4-factor Alpha 4-factor Alpha CAPM Alpha 6-factor Alpha 
      
%Inst. Clients 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
 (4.17) (3.64) (3.65) (4.01) (2.58) 
Fund Controls:      
Log(TNA)  -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 
  (-0.02) (-1.09) (-0.56) (-1.42) 
Log(Age)  0.002*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 
  (3.99) (4.08) (2.82) (3.49) 
Net Flows  0.071*** 0.072*** 0.055*** 0.067** 
  (5.86) (6.04) (3.91) (5.08) 
Std Flows  -0.111 -0.115 -0.117 -0.077 
  (-1.18) (-1.22) (-1.08) (-0.76) 
Turnover  -0.006 -0.007 0.005 -0.005 
  (-0.69) (-0.78) (0.48) (-0.49) 
Expense  -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.076*** -0.056*** 
  (-4.00) (-4.00) (-5.52) (-3.86) 
I Share  0.011 0.009 -0.003 0.004 
  (1.02) (0.83) (-0.29) (0.36) 
Closed  0.002 0.005 0.002 0.001 
  (0.07) (0.22) (0.08) (0.02) 
Outsourced  -0.010 -0.007 -0.002 -0.017 
  (-0.85) (-0.58) (-0.13) (-1.25) 
Adviser Controls:      
Log(AUM)   0.004 0.003 0.004 
   (1.51) (1.04) (1.22) 
Log(Accts)   -0.003 0.000 -0.001 
   (-1.50) (0.00) (-0.58) 
Related Bank   -0.013 -0.023* -0.014 
   (-1.15) (-1.85) (-1.09) 
Related Brokerage   0.019 0.020 0.023 
   (1.39) (1.25) (1.45) 
Related Insurance   0.015 0.046*** 0.018 
   (1.13) (2.81) (1.17) 
Performance Fees   -0.005 -0.016 -0.002 
   (-0.42) (-1.17) (-0.15) 
Agency Cross Trade   0.011 0.012 -0.001 
   (0.78) (0.80) (-0.05) 
      
Month x Obj FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-adviser Sample Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 234,115 228,217 228,114 228,114 228,114 
Adj. R-squared 0.190 0.191 0.191 0.350 0.204 
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Table 5. Client Type Analyses 
 
This table reports coefficients from panel regressions of fund i’s monthly performance on fund and adviser 
characteristics. The sample is restricted to non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between 
January 2003 and December 2015. The performance measure in all columns is 4-factor alpha which is a one-month 
ahead alpha calculated using an estimation window over the previous 24 months. Column (1) of Panel A examines 
the percentage of investment adviser clients that are individuals as reported at the end of the prior fiscal year. Column 
(2) of Panel A examines the percentage of investment adviser clients that are high net worth individuals as reported 
at the end of the prior fiscal year. Column (3) of Panel A examines the percentage of investment adviser clients that 
are private funds as reported at the end of the prior fiscal year. Columns (4) of Panel A examines the percentage of 
investment adviser clients that are institutions (i.e., %Public + %Corporate + %Charity) as reported at the end of the 
prior fiscal year. Column (1) of Panel B examines the percentage of investment adviser clients that are state or 
municipal government entities as reported at the end of the prior fiscal year. Column (2) of Panel B examines the 
percentage of investment adviser clients that are corporations or other businesses as reported at the end of the prior 
fiscal year. Column (3) of Panel B examines the percentage of investment adviser clients that are charitable 
organizations as reported at the end of the prior fiscal year. Column (4) of Panel B examines the percentage of 
investment adviser clients that are pension or profit sharing plans as reported at the end of the prior fiscal year.  All 
regressions include the lagged fund and adviser control variables used in Table 4 (see Appendix A for details) and 
investment objective-by-month fixed effects. The sub-adviser sample excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser 
and uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised.  Standard errors are clustered 
on investment adviser, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
or 10% levels. 
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Panel A: Individuals, Private Funds, and Institutions 
 4-factor Alpha 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
%Individuals -0.003    
 (-1.38)    
%HNW Individuals  0.005   
  (1.54)   
%Private Funds   0.012**  
   (2.21)  
%Public + %Corporate + %Charity    0.010*** 
    (2.76) 
     
Fund & Adviser Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month x Obj FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-adviser Sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 228,114 228,114 228,114 228,114 
Adj. R-squared 0.191 0.191 0.191 0.191 
 
Panel B: Institutions by Type 
 4-factor Alpha 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
%Public 0.015**    
 (2.28)    
%Corporate  0.007   
  (1.16)   
%Charity   0.021**  
   (2.52)  
%Pension Plans    0.010*** 
    (2.60) 
     
Fund & Adviser Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month x Obj FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-adviser Sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 228,114 228,114 228,114 228,114 
Adj. R-squared 0.191 0.191 0.191 0.191 
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Table 6. Persistence of Differences in Mutual Fund Performance Realized by Institutional 
and Retail Advisers 
 
This table reports coefficients from panel regressions of fund i’s monthly performance on fund and adviser 
characteristics. The sample is restricted to non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between 
January 2003 and December 2015. The performance measure in all columns is 4-factor alpha which is a one-month 
ahead alpha calculated using an estimation window over the previous 24 months. The key explanatory variables of 
interest are various lags of %Inst. Clients. This is the sum of the percentages of public, corporate, charity, and private 
fund clients for fund i’s investment adviser reported on Form ADV at the end of the adviser’s fiscal year. All 
regressions include the lagged fund and adviser control variables used in Table 4 (see Appendix A for details) and 
investment objective-by-month fixed effects. The sub-adviser sample excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser 
and uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised.  Standard errors are clustered 
on investment adviser, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
or 10% levels. 
 4-factor Alpha 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
%Inst. Clientst-1 0.012***     
 (3.48)     
%Inst. Clientst-2  0.010***    
  (2.76)    
%Inst. Clientst-3   0.007*   
   (1.86)   
%Inst. Clientst-4    0.008**  
    (2.27)  
%Inst. Clientst-5     0.006 
     (1.62) 
      
Fund & Adviser Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month x Obj FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-adviser Sample Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 152,798 152,798 152,798 152,798 152,798 
Adj. R-squared 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 
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Table 7. Differences in Performance and Search Costs Faced by Mutual Fund Investors 
 
This table reports coefficients from panel regressions of fund i’s monthly performance on fund, adviser, and family 
characteristics. The sample is restricted to non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between 
January 2003 and December 2015. The dependent variable in all columns is 4-factor alpha which is a one-month 
ahead alpha calculated using an estimation window over the previous 24 months. The key explanatory variable of 
interest is %Inst. Clients. This is the sum of the percentages of public, corporate, charity, and private fund clients for 
fund i’s investment adviser reported on Form ADV at the end of the previous fiscal year. Columns (2), (3), and (4) 
examine how the relationship between mutual fund performance and the presence of institutional clients varies in 
mutual fund market segments where search costs differ. I use three fund family characteristics from prior literature 
to proxy for mutual fund investor search costs. Column (2) uses lagged family size, i.e., the natural log of the fund 
family’s total net assets. Column (3) uses natural log of the dollar value of the family’s fund marketing and 
distribution expenses calculated at the end of the prior calendar year. Column (4) uses a measure of media attention. 
I compute an indicator variable equal to one if the fund’s family has had a fund on the WSJ quarterly category kings 
list in the past 24 months and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for further detail on calculations. All regressions 
include the lagged fund and adviser control variables used in Table 4 (see Appendix A for details) and investment 
objective-by-month fixed effects. The sub-adviser sample excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser and uses 
Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised.  Standard errors are clustered on 
investment adviser, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% or 
10% levels. 
 4-factor Alpha 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
%Inst. Clients 0.011*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (3.65) (3.10) (3.99) (3.56) 
Log(Family TNA)  0.003   
  (1.08)   
%Inst. Clients * Log(Family TNA)  -0.002**   
  (-1.99)   
Log(Family Mkting Exp)   0.003  
   (0.75)  
%Inst. Clients * Log(Family Mkting Exp)   -0.003**  
   (-2.55)  
WSJ Category Kings    0.034** 
    (2.34) 
%Inst. Clients * WSJ Category Kings    -0.009* 
    (-1.80) 
     
Fund & Adviser Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month x Obj FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-adviser Sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 228,114 228,114 228,114 228,114 
Adj. R-squared 0.191 0.192 0.192 0.192 
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Table 8. Institutional Client Preferences for Adviser Operational Characteristics 
 
This table reports coefficients from the following panel regression model of investment adviser j’s annual 
percentage of institutional clientele on other adviser characteristics: 
, 0 , ,% . j t j t j tInst Clients X Yearβ β ε= + + +  
The sample is restricted to investment advisers managing non-specialty domestic equity mutual funds between 
2003 and 2015. The dependent variable in all columns is %Inst. Clients. This is the sum of the percentages of 
public, corporate, charity, and private fund clients for fund i’s investment adviser reported on Form ADV. 
Explanatory variables include a vector of operational characteristics of interest to institutional plan sponsors as 
evidenced by questions in consultants’ requests for proposal (RFPs) and due diligence questionnaires (DDQs). 
Columns (1) and (2) consider a Tobit model as %Inst. Clients is from bounded from below at zero. See Appendix 
A for all explanatory variable definitions. The table uses the sample of advisers from the sub-adviser sample. The 
sub-adviser sample excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser and uses Form ADV data disclosed by the 
fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised. All regressions include year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered on investment adviser and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. 
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 %Inst. Clients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tobit Tobit OLS OLS 
     
Log(AUM) 2.25*** 2.29*** 1.89*** 1.93*** 
 (6.00) (5.96) (6.59) (6.59) 
Log(Accts) 0.962*** 0.964*** -0.257 -0.255 
 (3.41) (3.37) (-1.28) (-1.25) 
Independent 4.50***  3.34***  
 (3.12)  (2.81)  
Related Bank  1.60  0.953 
  (1.21)  (0.91) 
Related Brokerage  -3.32**  -2.44** 
  (-2.12)  (-1.99) 
Related Insurance  -1.85  -1.13 
  (-1.03)  (-0.83) 
Employee Ownership 4.39*** 4.44*** 2.63** 2.66** 
 (3.03) (3.03) (2.32) (2.32) 
Legal/Regulatory Issues -3.81*** -3.64*** -3.05*** -2.91*** 
 (-2.72) (-2.59) (-2.73) (-2.58) 
Dedicated CCO 3.47*** 3.28*** 3.03*** 2.88*** 
 (3.05) (2.86) (3.34) (3.15) 
GIPS Compliant 4.33*** 4.37*** 3.44*** 3.58*** 
 (3.34) (3.36) (3.11) (3.20) 
Performance Fees 17.61*** 17.69*** 14.28*** 14.34*** 
 (13.65) (13.65) (13.35) (13.36) 
Agency Cross Trade -5.51*** -5.25*** -4.58*** -4.38*** 
 (-3.52) (-3.24) (-3.51) (-3.24) 
     
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-adviser Sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,021 7,021 7,021 7,021 
Pseudo R-squared 0.040 0.040 N/A N/A 
Adj. R-squared N/A N/A 0.221 0.221 
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Table 9. Institutional Clients’ Factor Model Preferences 
 
Panel A of this table reports coefficients from the following panel regression model of fund i’s investment adviser j’s 
annual change in percentage of institutional clientele on the fund’s risk-adjusted performance over the prior calendar 
year and other fund and adviser characteristics: 
, , 0 1 , , 1 , , 1 , ,% . i j t i j t i j t i j tInst Clients Alpha X Year Objectiveβ β β ε− −∆ = + + + × +  
Panel B presents the results of pairwise comparisons of different performance measures (prior year) to predict annual 
changes in the investment adviser’s institutional clientele similar to Barber, Huang and Odean (2016). The sample is 
restricted to non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between January 2003 and December 2015. 
I first estimate the relation between changes in %Inst. Clients and a fund’s decile ranking based on different trailing 
annual performance measures by estimating the following regression:  
, , , , , 1 , , 1 , ,% . i j t kl kl i j t i j t i j tk lInst Clients a b D cX Year Objective ε− −∆ = + + + × +∑ ∑  
Dkl is an indicator variable that is one if fund i is in decile k (l) based on the first (second) performance measure over the 
prior year. For each pairwise comparison of performance measures, I obtain 45 pairs of flow-performance sensitivity 
estimates. I test the hypothesis that the summed difference across the 45 pairs of estimates equals zero (t-statistics in 
parentheses), and I also perform a binomial test (z-statistics in parentheses) which examines the null hypothesis that the 
proportion of positive differences equals 50%. See Appendix A for all explanatory and control variable definitions. All 
regressions in the table include year-by-investment objective fixed effects and fund and adviser control variables from 
Table 4. I also include the adviser’s percentage of institutional clientele at the beginning of year t as a control variable. 
The sub-adviser sample excludes funds with more than one sub-adviser and uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s 
sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised. Standard errors are clustered on investment adviser and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. 
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Panel A: Baseline OLS Regressions 
 ∆%Inst. Clients 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CAPM Alpha 2.62    
 (1.46)    
3-factor Alpha  5.46***   
  (2.70)   
4-factor Alpha   6.53***  
   (3.26)  
6-factor Alpha     4.64*** 
    (2.63) 
     
Fund & Adviser Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x Obj FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-adviser Sample Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 18,206 18,206 18,206 18,206 
Adj. R-squared 0.081 0.082 0.082 0.082 
 
Panel B: Horserace Tests of Institutional Clientele Factor Model Preferences 
 (1) (2) 
Risk Models Sum of Diff Prop of Diff > 0 
   
CAPM vs 3-factor -33.13* 0.267*** 
 (-1.74) (-3.13) 
CAPM vs 4-factor -41.06*** 0.311** 
 (-2.94) (-2.53) 
CAPM vs 6-factor -20.52 0.444 
 (-1.59) (-0.75) 
3-factor vs 4-factor 14.71 0.422 
 (0.77) (-1.04) 
3-factor vs 6-factor 13.59 0.556 
 (0.75) (0.74) 
4-factor vs 6-factor 25.63 0.556 
 (0.88) (0.74) 
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Table 10. Robustness Checks of the Main Result 
 
This table reports coefficients from panel regressions of fund i’s monthly performance on fund and adviser characteristics. The sample is restricted to 
non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between January 2003 and December 2015. The performance measure in all columns 
is 4-factor alpha which is a one-month ahead alpha calculated using an estimation window over the previous 24 months. The key independent variable 
in all columns is %Inst. Clients. This is the sum of the percentages of public, corporate, charity, and private fund clients for fund i’s investment adviser 
reported at the end of the prior fiscal year. Column (1) restricts the sample to retail funds. Retail funds consist of the sample of funds deriving assets 
some portion of their assets from retail share classes, i.e. I Share < 1. Column (2) restricts the sample to institutional funds, i.e., I Share = 1. Column 
(3) controls for advisers who choose not to pursue institutional clients (i.e., whose percentage of institutional clients is equal to zero) by adding an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if %Inst. Clients equals zero and zero otherwise. Column (4) examines a piecewise linear specification for %Inst. 
Clients allowing for kinks in the relationship at 25% and 50% institutional clients. The formula for the low institutional clients variable is Low %Inst. 
Clients = Min(25, %Inst. Clients), the formula for medium institutional clients is Med %Inst. Clients = Min(25, %Inst. Clients – Low %Inst. Clients), 
and the formula for high institutional clients is High %Inst. Clients = %Inst. Clients – Med %Inst. Clients – Low %Inst. Clients. Columns (5) and (6) 
use band minimums and maximums for each Form ADV client type to calculate %Inst. Clients as opposed to band midpoints. Column (7) adds MSA 
fixed effects to the regression specification using the metropolitan statistical area where the fund’s sub-adviser/adviser is located. Column (8) omits 
the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009 to ensure results are not driven by this particular time period. Column (9) presents estimates from a median 
regression. Column (10) presents estimates using Fama-MacBeth regression. All regressions include the lagged fund and adviser control variables 
used in Table 4 (see Appendix A for details). Regressions in Columns (1) – (8) use investment objective-by-month fixed effects. The regression in 
column (10) uses investment objective fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on investment adviser in columns (1) – (9). Standard errors in 
Column (10) use  Newey and West (1987) estimates with lags of order 3. The sub-adviser sample is used in all columns and excludes funds with more 
than one sub-adviser and uses Form ADV data disclosed by the fund’s sub-adviser if the fund is sub-advised. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. 
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 4-factor Alpha 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Inst. 
Funds 
(2) 
Retail 
Funds 
 (3) 
Inst. 
Clients=0 
Dummy  
(4) 
Piecewise  
Linear 
 
(5) 
%Inst. 
Clients 
Band Min 
(6) 
%Inst. 
Clients 
Band Max 
(7) 
MSA 
Fixed 
Effects 
(8) 
Ex-
Financial 
Crisis 
(9) 
Median 
Reg 
(10) 
Fama-
MacBeth 
           
%Inst. Clients 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.008***  0.013*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 (2.81) (3.61) (2.92)  (3.40) (3.82) (2.82) (3.43) (3.08) (4.14) 
%Inst. Clients = 0   -0.028*        
   (-1.81)        
Low %Inst. Clients    0.032***       
    (3.49)       
Med %Inst Clients    0.002       
    (0.23)       
High %Inst Clients    -0.000       
    (-0.06)       
           
Fund & Adviser 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month x Obj FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
MSA FEs No No No No No No Yes No No No 
Objective FEs No No No No No No No No No Yes 
N 30,731 197,366 228,114 228,114 228,114 228,114 227,823 210,443 228,114 228,114 
Adj. R-squared 0.208 0.190 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.123 0.001 0.082 
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Table 11. Mutual Fund Shareholders’ Factor Model Preferences 
 
This table presents the results of pairwise comparisons of different performance measures (trailing 12-month) to predict monthly fund flows as in 
Barber, Huang and Odean (2016). The sample is restricted to non-specialty actively managed domestic equity funds operating between January 2003 
and December 2015. Fund-month observations in columns (3) – (8) are partitioned into terciles based on %Inst. Clients (as in the adviser sample) in 
month t-1. I first estimate the relation between flows and a fund’s decile ranking based on different trailing 12-month performance measures by 
estimating the following regression with Flow being the fund flows for fund i in month t.:  
, , , , , 1, 12 , , 1 , ,i j t kl kl i j t t i j t i j tk l
Flow a b D cX Month Objective ε− − −= + + + × +∑ ∑  
Dkl is an indicator variable that is one if fund i is in decile k (l) based on the first (second) performance measure over the trailing 12-months. X is a 
vector of lagged fund and adviser controls as in Table 4. I also include month-by-investment objective fixed effects and standard errors are clustered 
on month and investment adviser. For each pairwise comparison of performance measures, I obtain 45 pairs of flow-performance sensitivity estimates. 
I test the hypothesis that the summed difference across the 45 pairs of estimates equals zero (t-statistics in parentheses), and I also perform a binomial 
test (z-statistics in parentheses) which examines the null hypothesis that the proportion of positive differences equals 50%. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% levels. 
 Full Sample of Funds Low %Inst. Clients Med %Inst. Clients High %Inst. Clients 
Risk Models 
(1) 
Sum of Diff 
(2) 
Prop of 
Diff > 0 
(3) 
Sum of Diff 
(4) 
Prop of 
Diff > 0 
(5) 
Sum of Diff 
(6) 
Prop of 
Diff > 0 
(7) 
Sum of Diff 
(8) 
Prop of 
Diff > 0 
         
CAPM vs 3-factor 10.33*** 0.844*** 13.47*** 0.689** 9.65*** 0.778*** 8.40** 0.622 
 (4.07) (4.62) (3.09) (2.53) (3.21) (3.73) (1.98) (1.64) 
CAPM vs 4-factor 14.05*** 0.956*** 12.35*** 0.711*** 14.49*** 0.956*** 14.56*** 0.822*** 
 (5.94) (6.11) (3.69) (2.83) (5.21) (6.11) (4.15) (4.32) 
CAPM vs 6-factor 21.21*** 0.978*** 21.18*** 0.889*** 22.10*** 0.889*** 20.72*** 0.867*** 
 (10.17) (6.41) (9.74) (5.22) (9.10) (5.22) (9.29) (4.92) 
3-factor vs 4-factor 15.55*** 0.978*** 16.02*** 0.667** 15.89*** 0.889*** 14.87*** 0.711*** 
 (3.60) (6.41) (3.37) (2.24) (3.33) (5.22) (3.36) (2.83) 
3-factor vs 6-factor 26.13*** 0.978*** 26.41*** 0.889*** 23.80*** 0.956*** 30.60*** 1.000*** 
 (7.96) (6.41) (7.13) (5.21) (6.30) (6.11) (6.45) (6.71) 
4-factor vs 6-factor 31.59*** 0.978*** 35.04*** 0.956*** 24.35*** 0.978*** 39.00*** 0.911*** 
 (6.49) (6.41) (5.74) (6.11) (4.83) (6.41) (5.84) (5.52) 
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